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Identifying business cycle stylised facts is essential as these often form the basis 
for the construction and validation of theoretical business cycle models. 
Furthermore, understanding the cyclical patterns in economic activity, and their 
causes, is important to the decisions of both policymakers and market 
participants. Previous analyses of developing country stylised facts have tended 
to feature only small samples, for example the seminal paper by Agénor et al. 
(2000) considers just twelve middle-income economies. Consequently, unlike for 
the industrialised countries, there is not a consistent set of developing country 
business cycle stylised facts. Motivated by importance of these business cycle 
statistics, this paper makes an important contribution to the literature by 
extending and generalising the developing country stylised facts for a sample of 
thirty-two developing countries. In particular, it is found that real interest rates 
are, on average, weakly procyclical in developing countries, not countercyclical as 
previously reported; this holds only for the Latin American economies. There is 
evidence that money leads the cycle in numerous developing economies, and 
thus that monetary shocks are an important source of business cycle fluctuations. 
However domestic credit, which is thought to fulfil an important role in 
determining investment, and hence economic activity, in developing economies, 
is found to lag, rather than lead, the cycle, thus implying that fluctuations in 
output influence credit rather than credit influencing the business cycle. A final 
key empirical finding is that developing country business cycles are characterised 
by significantly persistent output fluctuations; however, the magnitude of this 
persistence is somewhat lower than for the developed countries. Furthermore, 
prices and nominal wages are found to be significantly persistent in almost all of 
the developing countries. This finding is particularly important, because it justifies 
the use of theoretical models with staggered prices and wages for the modelling 
of developing country business cycles.  
JEL Classification: E31, E32, E52, F41, O50 
Keywords: Business cycle; Developing economies; Stylised facts; Volatility; 
Persistence; Cross-correlations. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, Kydland and Prescott established the first set of “stylised facts” for business 
cycles in the developed world, based on their research into the US business cycle. This led 
to a burgeoning of literature freshly interested in the statistical properties of business 
cycles. However, this literature predominantly concentrated on the business cycles of 
industrialised countries. A noticeable exception to this pattern was the seminal paper by 
Agénor, McDermott and Prasad in 2000 that established a set of stylised facts for the 
business cycles of developing countries, and it is these stylised facts that are the subject 
of interest in this paper. 
Stylised facts, such as the ones conveyed by Kydland and Prescott (1990) and Agénor 
et al. (2000) are an important stepping-stone to the construction of a successful 
theoretical model, as they are often used as the empirical basis for formulating and 
validating theoretic models of the business cycle. Therefore, it is extremely important to 
ensure that the stylised facts are as accurate as possible. In the case of industrialised 
countries this is not a huge problem as there is a vast literature, providing substantial 
country coverage, and with the majority of the findings being robust between countries 
and authors. However, this is not the case for developing countries.  
Since Agénor et al. (2000) there have been numerous papers looking at developing 
countries, such as Rand and Tarp (2002), Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Aguar and 
Gopinath (2007). However the majority of these papers have remarkably small data sets, 
for example, Agénor et al. (2000) have a sample of twelve middle-income countries, Rand 
and Tarp (2002) have fifteen, whilst Neumeyer and Perri (2005) have only five developing 
countries in their sample. Noticeable exceptions to this rule are papers by Pallage and 
Robe (2001) and Bulir and Hamann (2001) which have 63 and 72 developing countries, 
respectively, in their samples. These papers, however, concentrate purely on stylised 
facts relating to foreign aid and consequently their datasets are not applicable in this 
analysis.
1 A fundamental feature that is clearly apparent from reviewing these papers is 
that there is not the same consistency of findings as for the industrialised countries; only 
some of the stylised facts reported in Agénor et al. (2000) are similarly reported in the 
subsequent literature and there is less consensus between countries, such that the 
results clearly depend on the countries included in the study. Motivated by this lack of 
consistency and the importance of business cycle stylised facts, this paper aims to 
generalise the business cycle statistics for a much larger sample of developing countries, 
and secondly to construct a more comprehensive set of stylised facts for use in 
subsequent theoretic modelling of developing country business cycles. 
In section two, this paper briefly reviews the literature and documents the stylised 
facts for both industrialised and developing country business cycles. Section three details 
the methodology employed in order to carry out the statistical analysis required to 
compute such stylised facts, whilst section four outlines the data sources and the 
countries included in this study. Section five documents the empirical regularities found 
                                                           
1 Pallage and Robe (2001) employ annual data for only two variables: GDP per capita and official development 
assistance. Similarly, Bulir and Hamann (2001) use annual data on aid, fiscal revenue and GDP. Neither of 
these datasets is sufficient to conduct a comprehensive analysis of developing country business cycles and 
the related stylised facts. 2 
including persistence of output and prices, volatility and cross-correlation analysis, and 
compares these results to the stylised facts reported in the literature. Finally, section six 
concludes and provides a summary of the main stylised facts emerging from this study. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW – WHAT ARE THE STYLISED FACTS? 
The stylised facts of industrialised country business cycles are well established; a vast 
body of literature documents a wide range of empirical regularities amongst these 
countries (Kydland and Prescott, 1990; Backus and Kehoe, 1992; Backus, Kehoe and 
Kydland, 1995; King and Watson, 1996; Basu and Taylor, 1999; Chari et al., 2002). 
However, this is not the case for developing countries. It is therefore important when 
trying to determine a set of developing country stylised facts, to first understand the key 
features of the industrialised country business cycles. These empirical regularities will 
then serve as benchmarks for comparison and identification of developing country 
stylised facts. 
The empirical regularities, or stylised facts, for the industrialised countries include: 
  Persistent real output fluctuations and real exchange rate fluctuations (in recent 
years). Real exchange rates are also typically fairly volatile.  
  Volatility of output, consumption and net exports very similar (consumption and 
net exports slightly less volatile than output) whilst investment is consistently 2 to 
3 times more volatile and government expenditures are significantly less volatile 
than output (by around half). 
  A remarkably stable relationship between output, consumption and inflation. 
  Consumption, investment, employment, inflation and money velocity all generally 
procyclical. 
  Increasing procyclicality of the real wage, whilst price is consistently 
countercyclical and inflation is generally procyclical. 
  Ratio of net exports to output typically countercyclical. 
  Government expenditures typically acyclical. 
  International comovements in output, consumption and investment, but output 
correlations are generally higher than consumption correlations. 
  Correlations between the real exchange rate and aggregate quantities, in 
particular relative consumption, are fairly small. 
The stylised facts for the industrialised countries are summarised in Table 1. This 
table reveals that the business cycles of all the countries have fairly similar properties; 
investment is clearly 2 to 3 times more volatile than output, consumption and net 
exports; real output, consumption, investment and real wages are all procyclical, whilst 
net exports and government expenditures are generally countercyclical and acyclical 
respectively. 
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Table 1. Properties of Business Cycles in OECD Countries (1970:1 – 1990:2) 
Country  St. Dev (%)  Ratio St. Dev to  Correlation with Y 
St. Dev of Y 
  y  nx  c  i  g  n  y  c  i  g  nx  n 
 Australia  1.5  1.2  0.7  2.8  1.3  0.3  0.6  0.4  0.7  0.2  0  0.1 
 Austria  1.3  1.2  1.1  2.9  0.4  1.2  0.6  0.7  0.8  -0.2  -0.5  0.6 
 Canada  1.5  0.8  0.9  2.8  0.8  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.5  -0.2  -0.3  0.7 
 France  0.9  0.8  1.0  3.0  0.7  0.6  0.8  0.6  0.8  0.3  -0.3  0.8 
 Germany  1.5  0.8  0.9  2.9  0.8  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.3  -0.1  0.6 
 Italy  1.7  1.3  0.8  2  0.4  0.4  0.9  0.8  0.9  0  -0.7  0.4 
 Japan  1.4  0.9  1.1  2.4  0.8  0.4  0.8  0.8  0.9  0  -0.2  0.6 
 Switzerland  1.9  1.3  0.7  2.3  0.5  0.7  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.3  -0.7  0.8 
 UK  1.6  1.2  1.2  2.3  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.1  -0.2  0.5 
 US  1.9  0.5  0.8  3.3  0.8  0.6  0.9  0.8  0.9  0.1  -0.4  0.9 
 Europe  1.0  0.5  0.8  2.1  0.5  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.9  0.1  -0.3  0.3 
Source: Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995, p. 334; Table 11.1) 
The number of empirical studies for developing countries is rather more limited, 
however includes works by Agénor et al. (2000), Rand and Tarp (2002), Neumeyer and 
Perri (2005) and Aguar and Gopinath (2007). In 2000, Agénor et al. established a set of 
stylised facts for the business cycles of developing countries and this has become the 
seminal work upon which most subsequent studies compare their findings. 
Based on a sample of twelve middle-income developing countries (Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, the Philippines, Tunisia, Turkey and Uruguay) for the period 
1978:1 – 1995:4, Agénor et al. (2000) found significant differences from industrialised 
country business cycles. Their key findings, or stylised facts, and how these compare to 
the stylised facts for the industrialised countries are as follows. Firstly, output volatility 
varies substantially across developing countries and is on average much higher than the 
level typically observed in industrial countries. However, developing countries also show 
considerable persistence in output fluctuations as observed in the industrialized 
countries. Secondly, that activity in industrial countries, as measured by world output and 
world real interest rate, has a significantly positive influence on output in most 
developing countries. Thirdly, government expenditures and the fiscal impulse appear to 
be countercyclical whilst there is no distinct pattern in government revenue; it is acyclical 
in some countries in their sample and significantly countercyclical in others. Fourthly, 
there is evidence of procyclical real wages as in the developed countries. Fifthly, whilst 
prices are widely documented as being countercyclical in the industrialised countries, 
there appears to be no consistent relationship between either output and prices or 
output and inflation in developing countries. Sixthly, contemporaneous correlations 
between money and output are broadly positive, but not very strong, which is in contrast 
to the evidence for many industrial countries, and suggests that there is need to examine 
the key role often assigned to monetary policy in stabilization programs in developing 
countries. Furthermore, whilst the velocity of broad money is weakly procyclical in most 
industrialised countries it appears to be strongly countercyclical in this sample of 
developing countries. Seventhly, there is no robust relationship between the trade 4 
balance and output. Where it is procyclical, this “may indicate that fluctuations in 
industrial output are driven by export demand and that imports are not as sensitive to 
domestic demand fluctuations as they are in industrial countries” (Agénor et al., 2000, 
p.280). Furthermore, terms of trade are strongly procyclical suggesting much of the 
fluctuation in output in developing countries can be explained by terms of trade shocks, 
as has been suggested by Mendoza (1995). However, it is important to note that this is 
based on results for just three of the sample countries. Finally, there appears to be no 
systematic pattern for the correlation of nominal or real effective exchange rates and 
industrial output.  
A subsequent paper by Rand and Tarp (2002) added to this work by examining the 
duration of the business cycles and the volatility of the variables in addition to the cross-
correlation analysis. Based on a sample of fifteen developing countries (five in Sub-
Saharan Africa, five in Latin America and five in Asia and North Africa), with a quarterly 
dataset for the duration analysis (1980:1 – 1999:4) and an annual dataset for the cross-
correlation and volatility analysis (1970 – 1997) they report the following key results. 
Firstly, that developing country business cycles are significantly shorter than those of the 
industrialised countries; however, Male (2010) reveals this not to be the case. Secondly, 
that output is more volatile than in developed countries, but by no more than 15 to 20%, 
whilst consumption is generally more volatile than output, which is the opposite to what 
is found in developed countries. Thirdly, that consumption and investment are strongly 
procyclical, which is consistent with what is observed in the industrialised countries. 
However, the pattern is not so clear for prices and inflation; prices are not consistently 
countercyclical as for the industrialised countries and furthermore, inflation appears to 
have the same cyclical pattern as CPI, such that it is countercyclical for the majority of the 
sample, whilst in the developed countries inflation is generally procyclical. Fourthly, there 
is no consistent relationship between government consumption and output such that 
“governments seem to have a limited stabilising role on the economy” (Rand and Tarp, 
2000, p.2084), but this is similar to the observation in industrialised countries; see Table 
1. Fifthly, money aggregates are generally procyclical, as in industrialised countries. In 
addition, there is some indication of a positive relationship between domestic credit and 
output.  Sixthly there is no clear pattern when it comes to the terms of trade, whereas in 
industrialised countries there is generally positive correlation between lagged values of 
terms of trade and output. Finally, aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) appear to be 
highly volatile and show no signs of being procyclical, which is the opposite of the findings 
of Pallage and Robe (2001) and Bulir and Hamann (2001). 
Other recent studies by Aguar and Gopinath (2007) and Neumeyer and Perri (2005) 
add some interesting finding to the developing country stylised facts. Firstly, based on a 
sample of thirteen countries (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Peru, Philippines, Slovakia, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey) Aguar and Gopinath (2007) 
report a similar degree of output persistence but that output is twice as volatile as in the 
industrialised countries, whilst consumption is around 40% more volatile. Secondly, that 
the ratio of investment volatility to output volatility is not dissimilar from that found in 
the developed countries. Thirdly, that net exports are around 3 times more volatile and 
strongly countercyclical, as opposed to weakly countercyclical in the developed countries; 5 
and finally, that consumption and investment strongly procyclical, as found in the 
developed countries. 
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) find the very interesting result that real interest rates in 
developing countries are countercyclical and lead the cycle whereas they find no such 
pattern with the developed countries; real interest rates are mildly procyclical. They also 
find the volatility of real interest rates to be on average 40% higher in the developing 
countries. This is based on a sample of five developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, Korea, 
Mexico and the Philippines) and five developed countries (Australia, Canada, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, and Sweden).  
In summary, the key features that the literature appears to hail as the stylised facts for 
developing countries are: 
  Business cycles are generally shorter and more volatile than those of the 
industrialised countries. 
  Output is more volatile than in developed countries, but there is a similar degree 
of persistence in output fluctuations. 
  Consumption is more volatile than output in developing countries, opposite of 
developed country case. 
  Activity in developed countries, as measured by world output and world real 
interest rate, has a significantly positive influence on output in most developing 
countries. 
  Prices are not consistently countercyclical, as for developed countries, and 
inflation is not consistently procyclical. 
  Consumption, investment, real wages, money aggregates are all generally 
procyclical, which is consistent with the findings for developed countries. 
However these relationships are typically weaker in the developing country 
samples.  
  Real interest rates are countercyclical and lead the cycle, whereas real interest 
rates are typically mildly procyclical in developed countries. Real interest rates 
are also more volatile in the developing countries. 
  No clear relationships in terms of government expenditure, nominal or real 
effective exchange rates or terms of trade and output. 
However, these facts are formed on the basis of very small samples of developing 
countries and even based on these small samples there appears to be less consistency 
between countries than for the industrialised country samples. Thus, this paper proceeds 
to an empirical analysis to examine whether the developing country stylised facts hold for 
a much larger sample of developing countries, or whether they are robust only for 




The first step is to deseasonalize the data. This is done using the Census Bureau’s X-12 
ARIMA seasonal adjustment program. This is important for the correct implementation of 
the subsequent detrending procedure. For example, the HP filter will pass all of the series 
variations associated with the quarterly seasonal frequencies. Given that seasonal 
variation should not contaminate the cycle, for seasonal series the HP filter has to be 
applied to seasonally adjusted series (Kaiser and Maravall, 2001). 
Once deseasonalized, logarithms are taken of the data, as is common practice in the 
business cycle literature, and then the series are filtered to extract the stationary 
(cyclical) component and the non-stationary (trend) component. This is carried out 
because, following Lucas (1977), the business cycle component of a variable is defined as 
its deviation from trend. Furthermore, certain empirical characterisations of the data, 
including cross-correlations, are only valid if the series are stationary (Agénor et al., 
2000). 
In choosing a detrending technique, most researchers appear to opt for either the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) or the band-pass (BP) filter 
(Baxter and King, 1999), of which the HP filter is the most common choice: 
“One can say that the HP filtering of X11-SA series has become the present 
paradigm for business-cycle estimation in applied work” (Kaiser and Maravall, 
2001, p.66) 
The HP filter is a linear filter designed to optimally extract a non-stationary trend 
component, which changes smoothly over time, from an observed non-stationary time 
series. Assuming that the (deseasonalized) time series yt can be decomposed into an 
additive cyclical component ct and trend component gt, extracting the trend component 
will yield a stationary cyclical component, which can be used by researchers to analyse 
the business cycle: 
yt = ct + gt  for t = 1, … , T 
The trend component, gt, is determined by minimising: 
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Where, the smoothing parameter λ penalizes variability in the trend. The smoothing 
parameter λ is chosen a priori 
“… to isolate those cyclical fluctuations which belong to the specific band which 
the researcher wants to investigate” (Canova, 1998, p.485) 
The HP filter has the advantage that it does not amplify high-frequency noise (unlike 
a standard first differencing approach). However, it does have several disadvantages 
which mean that the method of detrending an economic time series by means of the HP 
filter should be used with care. Firstly, it allows much of the high frequency noise to be 7 
left outside the business cycle frequency band; the low-frequency BP filter has been 
adjusted to account for this. However, as a result it tends to underestimate the cyclical 
component (Rand and Tarp, 2002). Secondly, the HP filter gives imprecise estimates of 
the trend at the end-points of the time series. Thirdly, the HP filter cannot capture 
structural breaks in the data series. Fourthly, the HP filter can induce spurious cycles in 
the filtered series. And finally, the HP filter relies on an arbitrary choice of the smoothing 
parameter λ. 
This final point has caused much controversy over what the optimal value of λ 
should be. The default choice is that of λ = 1600 for quarterly data as computed, rather 
arbitrarily, by Hodrick and Prescott (1997): 
“Our prior view is that a 5 percent cyclical component is moderately large, as is a 
one-eighth of 1 percent change in the growth rate in a quarter. This led us to 
select   = 5/(1/8) = 40 or λ = 1600 as a value for the smoothing parameter” 
(p.4) 
However, Kydland and Prescott (1990), amongst others, find this value to be 
reasonable for quarterly time series and Hodrick and Prescott (1997) find that their 
results are little changed if λ is changed by a factor of four to 400 or 6400. Furthermore, 
using the default value of λ = 1600 Canova (1998) finds that:  
“The HP1600 filter produces results which are similar to those obtained with 
conventional band-pass filters (e.g. frequency domain masking the low frequency 
components of the data or standard MA filters) and concentrates the attention of 
the researcher on cycles with an average duration of 4–6 yr” (p.508) 
Rand and Tarp (2002) find that “the optimal value of λ is between five and 377 when 
quarterly data are used” (p.2074) for their sample of 15 developing countries. However, 
this draws on their finding that business cycles in developing countries are much shorter 
than those in developed countries.
2 As discussed in Male (2010), there is no clear 
significant difference between the duration of developing and developed country 
business cycles. The finding of Rand and Tarp (2002) results from their comparison of 
developing country business cycles measured from industrial production data with the 
standard results for developed country cycles, which are almost certainly calculated using 
real GDP. Thus, since the average length of cycles in this study is approximately 5 years, 
with a minimum length of 2.2 years and a maximum of 13.8 years, this choice of λ 
appears to be consistent with this sample. 
Despite all the criticisms, the HP filter remains the most commonly applied 
detrending technique in the business cycle literature and thus is the one applied here, 
with smoothing parameter λ = 1600. And, as Kaiser and Maravall (2001) note: 
“…a positive feature of the generalized use of the HP filter is that it has brought 
homogeneity in method, so that the effect of the choice of filter has been stabilized” 
(p.80) 
                                                           
2 They find the length of business cycles in their sample to be between 7.7 and 12 quarters compared with the 
24 and 32 quarters reported for developed countries. 8 
3.2. Volatility, Persistence and Correlations 
After deseasonalizing and detrending the series’ to obtain the cyclical components, the 
statistical analysis of the data can be carried out.
3  It should be noted that, as is standard 
in the literature, in the subsequent analysis all references to the variables refer to the 
cyclical components. The statistical analysis concentrates on those statistical features 
which are commonly quoted as the stylised facts of business cycles, namely volatility, 
persistence and cross-correlations. 
Volatility, or relative volatility, reports the magnitude of fluctuations of the variables 
of interest. Volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the variable whilst relative 
volatility is the ratio between the volatility of the variable of interest and the volatility of 
industrial production. A relative volatility of one implies that the variable has the same 
cyclical amplitude as the aggregate business cycle (as proxied by industrial production); 
whilst a relative volatility greater than one implies that the variable has greater cyclical 
amplitude than the aggregate business cycle. 
The persistence of the cyclical component of a variable is measured by its 
autocorrelation function. The significance of the persistence is measured using the Ljung-
Box portmanteau (Q) test for white noise; if the statistic has p > 0.05 then this is not 
significant and is considered to imply that there is little or no persistence in the cyclical 
component. 
Finally, following Agénor et al. (2000), the degree of co-movement of the variables 
of interest (yt) with industrial production (xt) is measured by the magnitude of the 
correlation coefficient    , 0 ,1 ,2 , . . . jj    . A series yt is considered to be pro-cyclical 
if the contemporaneous coefficient  (0) is positive, acyclical if the contemporaneous 
coefficient  (0) is zero and countercyclical if the contemporaneous coefficient  (0)
 
is 
negative. Figure 1 illustrates a procyclical series (yt) that either lags, is synchronous or 

















Figure 2. Series yt is countercyclical and (a) lags the cycle, (b) is synchronous with the cycle, (c) leads the cycle. 
                                                           
3 PCGive was used for the purposes of deseasonalizing and detrending the data. All subsequent statistical 
analysis in this paper was performed using STATA. 9 
The cross-correlation coefficients    , 0 ,1 ,2 , . . . jj    indicate whether a series 
yt leads, lags or is synchronous with the business cycle (xt). Series yt is considered to lead 
the cycle by j periods if the largest cross-correlation coefficient arises for a negative j (i.e. 
a lagged value of yt), be synchronous with the cycle if the largest cross-correlation 
coefficient arises at j = 0 or lag the cycle by j periods if the maximum cross-correlation 
arises for a positive j. For example, let yt be a procyclical series that leads the business 
cycle, as in Figure 1(c). In this case the maximum positive cross-correlation coefficient will 
occur for the correlation between xt and yt-j.  
  
4 DATA 
There are thirty-two developing countries included in this sample, of which there are five 
African countries (Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa), four North 
African and Middle Eastern countries (Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia), nine Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad 
and Tobago, and Uruguay), eight Asian countries (Bangladesh, Hong Kong, India, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Turkey) and six Central and Eastern 
European countries (Hungary, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, the Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia). In addition, three developed countries, the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Japan, are included as benchmarks upon which to compare the results for the 
developing countries. For a detailed discussion of the countries included, see Male 
(2010). 
As discussed in Male (2010), reliable real GDP data, which is usually used as a 
measure of the aggregate business cycle, is not available for a large number of developing 
countries, especially where quarterly data is concerned. Thus, the suggestion of Agénor et 
al. (2000) is followed, and indexes of industrial production are used as a suitable proxy for 
the aggregate business cycle. 
The other variables selected for analysis are also selected following Agénor et al. 
(2000). They include price variables (the consumer price index, inflation and the real wage 
rate); public sector variables (government expenditure, government revenue and the 
fiscal impulse); trade variables (imports, exports, trade balance and terms of trade); 
exchange rates (real and nominal effective exchange rates); money variables (broad 
money, private sector credit, interest rate and gross fixed capital formation); and finally, 
world output and world real interest rate to represent economic activity in the main 
industrial countries. 
The primary data source is the International Monetary Fund (IMF) International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) database. In the few cases where data was not available through 
the IMF, the variables were sought through the countries’ national statistics databases. 
The sample period varies depending on the availability of quarterly data for each country. 
However, there is good data coverage for the period from 1980 to 2004 across countries.
4 
Details of the data, including the corresponding IMF IFS series codes, can be found in 
Appendix A. 
  
                                                           
4 For a discussion of why this time-frame is appropriate, see Male (2010). 10 
5 EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
5.1. Persistence 
A key empirical feature of the industrialised countries’ business cycles is the significant 
persistence of output fluctuations, and the existing stylised facts for developing countries 
suggest that these cycles also exhibit significant output persistence.  There is also 
evidence of significant persistence of real exchange rate fluctuations in the industrialised 
countries, although there have been few, if any, empirical studies on this for the 
developing countries. These two empirical features have drawn much theoretical 
consideration, and most models incorporate nominal rigidities in the form of sticky prices 
and sticky wages in-order to explain these features. If such models are also to be applied 
to developing country business cycles, it is necessary to examine whether prices and 
nominal wages are indeed sticky in these countries.  
Thus, this section examines both the persistence of output and real exchange rate 
fluctuations for the developing countries, and the persistence of both the consumer price 
index and real wage. Table 2 reports the persistence of output and real effective 
exchange rates (REER), whilst Table 3 reports the persistence of the consumer price index 
and the nominal wage. 
Examination of the autocorrelations of output reveals that for most of the 
developing countries there is significant output persistence. However, the magnitude of 
this persistence is somewhat lower than for the industrialised countries; for example, the 
average autocorrelation coefficient at lag one for the industrialised countries is 0.84 
whilst it is just 0.59 for the developing countries, furthermore at lag four the average 
coefficient for the industrialised countries is 0.146, but this has dropped to zero for the 
developing countries. There are a few exceptions amongst the developing countries, for 
which output is not significantly persistence, namely Malawi, Morocco and Macedonia. 
Secondly, examination of the autocorrelations of the real effective exchange rates 
reveals that, with the sole exception of the Slovak Republic, all the developing countries 
exhibit significant real exchange rate persistence. However, the magnitude of this 
persistence is slightly lower than that for the developed countries; the average 
autocorrelation coefficient at lag one for the US, UK and Japan is 0.84, whilst it is 0.701 
for the developing countries. 
Thirdly, for all of the countries, with the exception of Uruguay, there is significant 
price persistence, although again this persistence is of a lower magnitude than for the 
industrialised countries. The lack of price persistence observed in Uruguay is explained by 
the extremely high average annual rate of inflation observed over the sampling period.
5 
Finally, the persistence of the nominal wage is examined. In this case, all of the 
developing countries display significant nominal wage persistence (or stickiness), but as 
with all the other variables, this is of a significantly lower magnitude than for the 
industrialised countries.  
The finding of significant price and wage persistence is important, because it justifies 
the use of theoretical models with staggered prices and wages for the modelling of 
developing country business cycles. However, the fact that this persistence is of a lower 
                                                           
5 The average annual inflation rate in Uruguay for the period 1980:1 – 2002:3 is 46% 11 
magnitude must be taken into consideration, for example by implementing shorter 
contract durations. 
Table 2. Persistence of Output and the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) 
Region  Country  Output  REER 
      Lag 1  Lag 2  Lag 3  Lag 4  Q  Lag 1  Lag 2  Lag 3  Lag 4  Q 
OECD  US  0.886  0.672  0.440  0.199  517.8**  0.883  0.639  0.503  0.349  417.4** 
  UK   0.756  0.549  0.372  0.147  451.6**  0.795  0.541  0.334  0.121  409.1** 
   Japan   0.891  0.671  0.388  0.091  396.6**  0.835  0.621  0.460  0.264  650.7** 
Africa   Côte D'Ivoire   0.432  0.149  0.189  0.047  142.6**  0.689  0.429  0.222  0.042  161.3** 
  Malawi   0.351  -0.036  -0.108  -0.029  18.8  0.435  0.265  -0.028  -0.014  44.2** 
  Nigeria   0.641  0.351  0.185  0.056  325.9**  0.846  0.648  0.441  0.230  262.9** 
  Senegal   0.385  0.074  0.039  -0.164  76.0**  …  …  …  …  … 
   South Africa   0.814  0.641  0.442  0.206  598.0**  0.760  0.501  0.337  0.117  214.1** 
North Africa   Israel   0.635  0.427  0.208  -0.032  218.3**  0.679  0.323  0.057  -0.128  142.9** 
  Jordan   0.452  0.020  -0.175  -0.310  62.6*  …  …  …  …  … 
  Morocco   0.041  0.188  0.207  -0.196  53.6  0.629  0.164  -0.174  -0.261  160.9** 
  Tunisia   0.422  0.233  0.138  -0.104  71.3**  0.818  0.623  0.461  0.263  391.5** 
Latin America  Argentina   0.808  0.584  0.329  0.070  99.6**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Barbados   0.614  0.418  0.155  0.018  168.7**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Brazil   0.632  0.153  -0.114  -0.267  91.9**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Colombia   0.565  0.341  0.144  -0.049  133.2**  0.798  0.590  0.392  0.161  182.1** 
  Chile   0.767  0.551  0.348  0.132  521.5**  0.771  0.556  0.353  0.138  538.1** 
  Mexico   0.800  0.603  0.370  0.158  377.6**  0.610  0.447  0.295  0.130  377.6** 
  Peru   0.817  0.556  0.312  0.142  325.2**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Trinidad   0.415  0.248  0.038  -0.184  91.6**  0.814  0.620  0.474  0.325  518.1** 
   Uruguay   0.635  0.574  0.382  0.128  186.7**  0.747  0.442  0.236  0.011  212.6** 
Asia  Bangladesh   0.396  0.052  -0.044  -0.121  72.6**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Hong Kong   0.725  0.445  0.144  -0.106  155.7**  0.801  0.539  0.257  0.013  293.0** 
  India   0.652  0.530  0.348  0.224  348.0**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Korea, South  0.776  0.537  0.299  0.109  371.6**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Malaysia   0.798  0.549  0.283  0.033  313.3**  0.829  0.570  0.372  0.205  271.8** 
  Pakistan   0.251  0.028  0.091  -0.030  44.5**  0.698  0.356  0.131  -0.058  141.1** 
  Philippines   0.717  0.495  0.275  0.084  157.8**  0.733  0.388  0.095  -0.169  261.9** 
  Turkey   0.621  0.411  0.219  -0.071  231.8**  …  …  …  …  … 
East Europe   Hungary   0.865  0.737  0.561  0.405  384.2**  0.794  0.610  0.468  0.284  300.1** 
  Lithuania   0.539  0.096  -0.071  -0.274  42.2**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Macedonia   0.351  -0.036  -0.108  -0.029  18.8  0.435  0.265  -0.028  -0.014  44.2** 
  Romania   0.836  0.712  0.611  0.471  678.9**  0.701  0.472  0.161  -0.124  155.7** 
  Slovenia   0.591  0.288  -0.027  -0.281  103.6**  …  …  …  …  … 
   Slovak Republic  0.637  0.307  0.084  -0.046  93.5**  0.442  0.050  -0.228  -0.298  39.1 
Average  Developed  0.844  0.630  0.400  0.146  …  0.838  0.600  0.432  0.245  … 
  Developing  0.593  0.351  0.180  0.000  …  0.701  0.443  0.215  0.043  … 
Significance is denoted by * if p<0.05 and ** if p<0.0112 
Table 3. Persistence of Prices and Wages 
Region  Country  CPI  Nominal Wage 
      Lag 1  Lag 2  Lag 3  Lag 4  Q  Lag 1  Lag 2  Lag 3  Lag 4  Q 
OECD  US  0.940  0.826  0.672  0.480  846.7**  0.814  0.611  0.449  0.258  343.3** 
  UK   0.911  0.759  0.563  0.368  707.2**  0.887  0.722  0.509  0.302  649.9** 
   Japan   0.912  0.781  0.610  0.384  608.0**  0.946  0.819  0.639  0.434  623.8** 
Africa   Côte D'Ivoire   0.826  0.625  0.432  0.250  488.9**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Malawi   0.731  0.442  0.150  -0.067  61.9**  0.529  0.204  -0.003  -0.172  32.1* 
  Nigeria   0.764  0.504  0.344  0.137  298.9**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Senegal   0.843  0.655  0.465  0.267  501.2**  …  …  …  …  … 
   South Africa   0.781  0.571  0.347  0.109  447.1**  …  …  …  …  … 
North Africa   Israel   0.459  0.316  0.269  0.144  109.9**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Jordan   0.883  0.761  0.615  0.438  562.5**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Morocco   0.814  0.572  0.321  0.062  316.9**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Tunisia   0.808  0.481  0.145  -0.100  125.9**  …  …  …  …  … 
Latin America  Argentina   0.816  0.558  0.267  0.073  114.6**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Barbados   0.902  0.756  0.592  0.405  774.5**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Brazil   0.889  0.703  0.484  0.250  150.2**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Colombia   0.566  0.297  0.098  -0.087  195.7**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Chile   0.491  0.375  0.214  -0.075  123.8**  0.727  0.476  0.358  0.249  104.9** 
  Mexico   0.829  0.671  0.521  0.384  319.4**  0.467  0.549  0.386  0.178  195.4** 
  Peru   0.328  0.523  0.266  0.085  57.2**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Trinidad   0.887  0.702  0.504  0.334  665.2**  …  …  …  …  … 
   Uruguay   0.418  -0.091  -0.096  -0.114  32.8  …  …  …  …  … 
Asia  Bangladesh   0.786  0.561  0.272  0.064  143.1**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Hong Kong   0.889  0.765  0.623  0.473  469.2**  0.781  0.620  0.413  0.224  76.8** 
  India   0.918  0.759  0.553  0.317  980.4**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Korea, South  0.913  0.762  0.583  0.377  605.9**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Malaysia   0.931  0.788  0.598  0.388  952.5**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Pakistan   0.906  0.757  0.593  0.417  778.4**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Philippines   0.810  0.601  0.347  0.123  403.7**  …  …  …  …  … 
  Turkey   0.667  0.404  0.246  0.071  86.6**  …  …  …  …  … 
East Europe   Hungary   0.891  0.731  0.568  0.382  358.3**  0.499  0.225  0.068  0.153  104.3** 
  Lithuania   0.628  0.309  0.103  -0.054  40.7*  …  …  …  …  … 
  Macedonia   0.731  0.442  0.150  -0.067  61.9**  0.529  0.204  -0.003  -0.172  32.1* 
  Romania   0.814  0.571  0.406  0.181  178.6**  0.720  0.599  0.482  0.204  181.0** 
  Slovenia   0.451  0.309  0.183  0.098  50.3**  0.723  0.511  0.300  0.126  89.8** 
   Slovak Republic  0.780  0.552  0.293  0.088  158.6**  0.583  0.334  0.058  -0.196  44.4** 
Average  Developed  0.921  0.789  0.615  0.411  …  0.883  0.717  0.533  0.331  … 
  Developing  0.755  0.554  0.358  0.167  …  0.618  0.414  0.229  0.066  … 
Significance is denoted by * if p<0.05 and ** if p<0.01 
5.2. Volatility 
The volatility analysis measures the magnitude of fluctuations of the variables of interest.  
From the previous literature, the stylised facts concerning volatility for developing 
country business cycles are: 13 
  Output volatility is higher than for the developed countries. 
  Consumption volatility is higher than output volatility; the opposite finding to 
that of the developed economies. 
  Inflation volatility is similar to that of the developed countries. 
  Investment volatility is two to three times higher than output volatility, which 
is similar to the levels observed in developed countries.  
  The real interest rate is significantly more volatile than for the developed 
countries.  
  Private credit is on average less volatile than in the developed countries. 
  Net exports are around three times more volatile than output. 
  Real exchange rates volatility is similar to that for the developed countries. 
These findings are examined here to see whether they are consistent when the 
sample is expanded to include thirty-two developing countries. Tables 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) 
present the results for the volatility of the variables for the individual countries, regional 
groups and income groups, respectively. Tables 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) similarly present the 
results for relative volatility. 
Firstly, output is, on average, twice as volatile in the developing countries than in the 
developed countries. Output is particularly volatile amongst the poorest countries; 
where, on average, output is 2.5 times more volatile than output in the industrialised 
economies. This contradicts the finding of Rand and Tarp (2002) who state that output is 
no more than 20% more volatile in developing countries; however, this discrepancy may 
result from their choice of HP-filter smoothing parameter.
6  
Loayza  et al. (2007) similarly document that output in developing economies is 
significantly more volatile than that of the industrialised economies and suggest that the 
excessive volatility in developing economies arises from three key sources. The first of 
these suggestions is that developing countries are subject to greater exogenous shocks. 
The second is that developing economies may be subject to greater domestic shocks 
arising, for example, from policy mistakes. The third, and final, is that external shocks 
have greater effects on volatility because the developing economies do not possess either 
the financial markets necessary to diversify risks or the ability to perform stabilising 
macroeconomic policy. This final point has significant implications for the welfare of the 
economy. Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005) document a significant negative relationship 
between economic growth and output volatility, which is exacerbated by underdeveloped 
financial markets and institutions. Thus, under these conditions, external shocks have a 
greater effect on volatility and consequently lower economic growth. In particular, it is 
estimated in Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005) that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
volatility would reduce the economy’s growth rate by 1.3%. 
 
                                                           
6 Rand and Tarp (2002) document that developing country business cycles are significantly shorter than those 
of the industrialised countries. Thus, they alter the HP-filer smoothing parameter accordingly. However, as 
revealed in Male (2010), the developing country cycles are not significantly shorter. Thus, it is not necessary 












Table 4(b). Summary of Volatility (by Region) 
OUTPUT – real manufacturing or industrial production, CPI – consumer price index, CCPI – inflation, RW – real wage, BM – broad money, BMVI – broad money velocity indicator, 
RDC – real domestic private sector credit, GEX – real government expenditure, GREV – real government revenue, FI – fiscal impulse, EXP – real exports of goods and services, IMP 
– real imports of goods and services, TB – trade balance, TOT – terms of trade, RPC – real private consumption, RGFCF – real gross fixed capital formation (investment), RMMR – 
real money market rate, RLR – real lending rate, NEER – nominal effective exchange rate, REER – real effective exchange rate. 
Note that numbers in italics indicate that annual rather than quarterly data has been used for that particular result. All of the variables refer to the Hodrick-Prescott filtered 
cyclical component. Significant differences from the developed country benchmarks (the United States, United Kingdom and Japan) are denoted by § (p < 0.05) and § (p < 0.01). 












  Table 5(b). Summary of Relative Volatility (by Region) 
Table 5(c). Summary of Relative Volatility (by Income) 
For notes see Table 4(c) 
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Returning to Tables 4(a) and 4(b), it is evident that the African and Eastern European 
countries exhibit the highest average volatilities. However, the Eastern European average 
is skewed by the exceedingly high output volatility of 14.5% observed in Lithuania, with all 
the other Eastern European countries exhibiting much lower output volatility. Another 
country with exceedingly high output volatility is the Philippines; at 18% this is three 
times greater than the developing country average and six times greater than the 
developed country average. This high output volatility was similarly observed in the 
amplitude analysis in Male (2010), where it was observed that the Philippines experience, 
on average, a 69% increase in output during business cycle expansions and a 50% 
reduction in output during recessions, compared to a 6.4% rise during expansions and a 
2% decline during recessions in the US.
7 Given the previous analysis, the excessive 
volatility in the Philippines may go some way to explaining the country’s relatively poor 
growth rates, in relation to the other Asian economies.
8  
Secondly, from Tables 5(a),(b) and (c), it is apparent that consumption in the 
developed countries (the US, the UK and Japan) is on average 50% less volatile than 
output, whereas in the developing countries consumption is, on average, 30% more 
volatile than output; however, there is much regional variation. Consumption volatility is 
highest in North Africa, and in particular in Israel where it is almost five times more 
volatile than output. Conversely, on average consumption volatility is slightly lower than 
output volatility in the Asian and Eastern European regions. The fact that consumption 
volatility is higher than output volatility in Africa, North Africa and Latin America points to 
a lack of consumption smoothing over the course of the business cycle in these regions. 
Thus, large welfare gains may be possible through reductions in consumption volatility in 
these regions (Loayza et al., 2007).  
Thirdly, government revenue and expenditure are significantly more volatile in the 
developing countries, than in the developed countries. On average government 
expenditure is four and a half times more volatile than output and government revenue is 
almost four times more volatile than output. This situation is worst in North Africa, where 
both government expenditure and revenue are more than seven times more volatile than 
output. The observed high volatility in these developing countries suggests that the 
government may actually aggravate business cycle fluctuation, rather than help to 
smooth them.  
Fourthly, from the existing stylised facts, it is expected that investment volatility in 
the developing countries should be two to three times higher than output volatility and of 
a similar level to that in the developed countries. However, whilst the East European 
countries have similar investment volatilities to the US, UK and Japan, the other 
developing countries have significantly higher investment volatilities. In particular, Africa 
and North Africa where investment volatility is almost four times greater than output 
volatility; most notably, Nigeria where investment is seven and a half times more volatile 
than output. However, when aggregating across income groupings the observed relative 
volatility of investment is consistent with that expected for the developing economies. 
                                                           
7 See Table 9 in Male (2010). 
8 For the period 1980 to 2005, the average growth rates of GDP and GDP per capita in the Philippines were 
2.86% and 0.59%, respectively, compared with regional averages of 5.05% for GDP and 3.13% for GDP per 
capita. See Table 2.2 for more information. 19 
Fifthly, considering prices and inflation it is obvious that the Latin American 
countries exhibit the highest volatilities, with prices more than six times more volatile 
than output and inflation more than twenty-six times more volatile than output. Prices in 
the developed countries and in Africa are less volatile than output, whilst prices in the 
other regions are around 50% more volatile than output. Referring now to inflation, with 
the exception of the Latin American countries, on average the developing countries 
exhibit significantly less inflation volatility than the developed countries; however, this 
result is skewed by the high inflation volatilities in the UK and Japan.  
Sixthly the money-related variables are examined. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) 
suggest that the real interest rate is significantly more volatile for developing economies 
than for developed countries. Examination of the absolute volatilities in Table 4(b) reveals 
that whilst for the real lending rate the North African, Latin American and Eastern 
European countries have higher volatilities than the developed countries. In the case of 
the real money market rate, only the Latin American countries have higher volatilities 
than the developed countries. Furthermore, examination of the relative volatilities in 
Table 5(a) reveals that, with just one exception, the relative volatility of real interest rates 
is lower in the developing countries than in the developed countries. For all countries, the 
volatility of the real interest rate is significantly greater than the volatility of output. The 
relative volatilities of both broad money and the broad money velocity indicator are 
similar amongst the developing and developed countries, only North Africa and Latin 
America have significantly greater relative volatilities of broad money. However, in 
developing countries it is important to additionally examine real domestic private sector 
credit. This is because, as discussed in Agénor et al. (2000), where equity markets are 
weakly capitalised private sector credit will have a significant influence on economic 
activity. Tables 5(a), (b) and (c) show the volatility of real domestic credit to be of a similar 
level to that of the developed countries, with slightly higher volatility in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe. This contradicts the finding of Rand and Tarp (2002) that private sector 
credit is on average less volatile than in the developed countries. 
Finally, the trade-related variables are considered. Firstly, the trade balance is 
examined. From the existing stylised facts, the expectation is that the trade balance 
should be around three times more volatile than output, and the results in Tables 5(a), (b) 
and (c) are consistent with this. Additionally, the relative volatility of the trade balance in 
the developing countries is significantly greater than that of the developed countries. The 
only exceptions are the Eastern European countries, where the trade balance is, on 
average, just 0.6 times more volatile than output. The findings for the imports, exports 
and the terms of trade are fairly similar to those for the trade balance.  
The volatility of the nominal and real effective exchange rates for the developing 
countries are similar to those for the developed countries, which is consistent with the 
finding of Rand and Tarp (2002). However, the Asian countries display significantly lower 
exchange rate volatility and moreover for these countries both the nominal and real 
exchange rates are less volatile than output. This is a significant finding, because one of 
the key features of international business cycles that has interested macroeconomists in 
recent years is the volatility and persistence of real exchange rates. Flood and Rose (1995) 
suggest that whilst the choice of exchange rate regime affects the volatility of the 
exchange rate, the volatility of output is stable across regimes. Therefore, where 20 
economies maintain a fixed exchange rate regime, exchange rates will be less volatile 
than output. This is a consistent with the Asian experience for Hong Kong, Malaysia and 
Pakistan; all of which have held fixed, or pegged, exchange rates for significant durations 
of the sample period. However, the Philippines, which has the lowest relative volatility, 
has held a free-float since 1983. Nonetheless, the low relative volatility can perhaps be 
explained simply by the extremely high output volatility experienced in the Philippines. 
Compared to the other Asian economies, the Philippines has the highest absolute 
volatility of exchange rates (6.1%), resulting from its free-float, however in relation to its 
output volatility of 18.0%, the relative volatility of the exchange rates is extremely low.  
 
5.3. Cross-Correlations with Real Domestic Output 
The degree of co-movement of the variables of interest (yt) with real industrial (or 
manufacturing) production (xt) is measured by the magnitude of the correlation 
coefficient     , 0 ,1 ,2 , . . . jj    . Following the reasoning of Agénor et al. (2000), the 
series is considered to be strongly contemporaneously correlated if   0.22 1 j   , 
weakly contemporaneously correlated if   0.11 0.22 j    and contemporaneously 
uncorrelated with the cycle if   00 . 1 1 j   . These values are selected because, given 
the average number of observations per country, the average standard error of the 
correlation coefficients, computed under the null hypothesis of no correlation, is 0.11.  
Tables 6(a), 6(b) and 6(c) report the contemporaneous correlations for all the 
variables with output. Tables reporting the cross-correlations between domestic output 
and each of the variables with leads and lags are available in Appendix B. 
(a) Industrial Country Business Cycles 
The first relationship considered is whether output fluctuations in developing 
countries are positively correlated with economic activity in the main industrialised 
countries, as proxied by world output and world real interest rate. In particular, Agénor et 
al. (2000) suggest that relationship with the world real interest rate could be important 
because it is likely to effect economic activity in the developing country by both affecting 
domestic interest rates and by reflecting credit conditions in international capital 
markets. 
From Table 6(a), it can be seen that there is a clear relationship, the 
contemporaneous correlation of domestic output  with world output is positive for all the 
developing countries, with the sole exception of Jordan (ρ(0) = -0.035). The majority of 
countries peak at j = 0, or at least by j = 4, suggesting that output fluctuations in the 
industrialised countries are transmitted fairly rapidly to developing countries. 
For world real interest rate, Table 6(a) shows a slightly less clear relationship. The 
contemporaneous correlation between domestic output and the world real interest rate 
is positive for most countries; however, it is negative for five countries and there is no 
significant relationship for six countries. The majority peak at j = 0, suggesting rapid 
transmission, but again there is more variation than for world output. Where there is a 
positive correlation, this may reflect the positive spill over effect of pro-cyclical interest 
rates in the industrialised countries on the developing country’s output. 2
1
 





Table 6(b). Summary of Contemporaneous Correlations with Real Domestic Output (by Region)  
Table 6(c). Summary of Contemporaneous Correlations with Real Domestic Output (by Income)  
WO – world real output, WIR – world real interest rate. For other variable names, see Table 4(c). 
Note that numbers marked in bold indicate weak contemporaneous correlation and numbers marked in bold with a * indicate strong contemporaneous correlation. All of the 
variables refer to the Hodrick-Prescott filtered cyclical component. Significant differences from the developed country benchmarks (the United States, United Kingdom and Japan) 
are denoted by § (p < 0.05) and § (p < 0.01). 
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Examination of Table 6(c) would seem to suggest that contemporaneous correlation 
between domestic output and the world real interest rate increases as economies 
become relatively more developed. This may reflect the fact that as economies develop, 
their domestic capital markets become more sophisticated and thus are more likely to be 
influenced by changes in international credit conditions.   
Overall, findings for both of world output and world real interest rate are consistent 
with Agénor et al. (2000).  
(b) Prices, Inflation and Real Wages 
For the industrialised countries, there is a clear pattern of countercyclical prices and 
a substantial literature documenting this. For developing countries, however this pattern 
is not nearly so clear. Rand and Tarp (2002) report a large negative association between 
CPI and GDP, whilst Agénor et al. (2000) find a generally negative pattern with a few 
significant positive relationships in Chile, Mexico, the Philippines and Uruguay. 
Table 6(a) reports significant countercyclical prices for the US, the UK and Japan, and 
similarly prices are countercyclical in eighteen of the developing countries, and strongly 
so in thirteen of these. However, prices are acyclical in six of the developing countries and 
procyclical in eight. In particular, Argentina, Brazil and the Slovak Republic have strongly 
procyclical prices. Thus, this supports the findings of Agénor et al. (2000) that there is not 
a consistent negative relationship for the developing countries. 
There is a similar lack of consistency in the relationship between output and inflation 
in the developing countries. Looking at Table 6(a), inflation is strongly procyclical in the 
industrialised countries and in sixteen of the developing countries, whilst it is 
countercyclical in the remaining seventeen developing countries. Looking closer, 
however, there does appear to be a relationship between the CPI correlations and the 
inflation correlations for the developing countries; there is a tendency for those 
developing countries with countercyclical CPI to also exhibit countercyclical inflation. This 
is a significant difference from the pattern of procyclical inflation and countercyclical 
prices in the industrialised countries. 
The identification of the pattern of price and inflation correlations with output is 
necessary for the correct classification of demand and supply shocks. Chadha and Prasad 
(1994), amongst others, identify that if fluctuations in output are attributable to demand 
shocks, then both prices and inflation should be procyclical. Conversely, if such 
fluctuations are attributable to supply shocks, both prices and inflation should be 
countercyclical. For many of the countries examined here, including the developed 
countries, it is therefore difficult to clearly identify whether business cycle fluctuations 
are driven by supply or demand shocks. However, for several of the developing countries 
there is a clear pattern of both countercyclical prices and inflation.
9 Consequently, it is 
plausible that business cycles in these countries are driven by supply shocks. Conversely, 
both prices and inflation are strongly procyclical in Argentina, Brazil and Slovenia, 
suggesting that business cycle fluctuations in these countries are attributable to demand 
shocks. 
                                                           
9 Both prices and inflation are strongly countercyclical in Malawi, Nigeria, Mexico, South Korea and Romania. 24 
The correlation between output and real wages shows much more consistency. In 
almost all the countries, both developing and developed, the contemporaneous 
correlation is positive suggesting procyclical real wages. The only exceptions in this case 
are Chile and the Slovak Republic, where real wages are acyclical. As discussed in Agénor 
et al. (2000), the identification of whether real wages are procyclical or countercyclical 
has important implications for the choice of theoretical model to represent developing 
country business cycles. The procyclical wages in this case suggest the application of 
either a New Keynesian model with imperfect competition and countercyclical mark-ups, 
or a real business cycle model.   
(c) Consumption and Investment 
Real private consumption is strongly procyclical for the OECD countries and for the 
majority of the developing countries in the sample. However, real private consumption is 
countercyclical for four developing countries, three of which are East European countries.  
With the exception of the East European countries, this is consistent with Rand and Tarp 
(2002) who find a robust positive relationship between output and both public and 
private consumption.  
Similarly, investment is strongly procyclical for the majority of countries in the 
sample, and almost all of these peak at a zero lag, which is identical to the finding of Rand 
and Tarp (2002). Two significant exceptions to this are Chile and Slovenia with very 
strongly countercyclical investment. 
(d) Public Sector Variables 
Fiscal policy can either dampen or exacerbate business cycle fluctuations depending 
on its timing. To have a stabilising effect on the economy, government expenditure 
should be countercyclical, whilst government revenues should be procyclical. Examining 
Tables 6(a), 6(b) and 6(c) reveals that there is no consistent relationship between output 
and government expenditures, or government revenues, for either the developed or 
developing countries. The US and the UK both exhibit strongly countercyclical 
government expenditures, whilst Japan has strongly procyclical government 
expenditures. However, upon reducing the time series for the developed countries to 
1980:1 to 2005:1, government expenditures in the US and UK remain strongly 
countercyclical, whilst becoming acyclical in Japan. The situation is worse for the 
developing countries, where it is even more critical for business cycle fluctuations to be 
smoothed, with evidence of strongly countercyclical expenditure in just three of the 
developing countries, whilst there is evidence of strongly procyclical expenditures in 
seven countries.  
Furthermore, just six of the developing countries exhibit procyclical government 
revenues, whilst eleven of the developing countries have strongly countercyclical 
government revenues. Thus, the governments in these countries need to address their 
revenue sources to ensure these do not reinforce fluctuations in the business cycle. 
Agénor et al. (2000) similarly find countercyclical government revenues and suggest this is 
likely to result from the negative effects of increases in tax revenues; however, this is 
based on a sample of just four developing countries. 25 
To measure the net effect of government expenditure and revenue on the domestic 
business cycle, the fiscal impulse is used. The fiscal impulse, as defined by Agénor et al. 
(2000), is the ratio of government expenditures to government revenue, and to be a 
stabilising influence on the business cycle it should be countercyclical. Eleven of the 
developing countries have significantly countercyclical fiscal impulses.  However, five 
countries have significantly procyclical fiscal impulses, of which three are Eastern 
European countries.  
(e) Money, Credit and Interest Rates 
Monetary policy is an important tool in macroeconomic stabilisation. However, the 
question of whether changes in money actually cause output fluctuations remains a 
pertinent one, both for developed and developing countries.
10 It is, thus, important to 
examine the relationship between the business cycle and monetary variables. 
The first relationship is that between the business cycle and broad money.
11 
Examination of Tables 6(a), (b) and (c) reveals that, on average, broad money is either 
weakly procyclical or acyclical. However, money is countercyclical in a number of 
developing countries; Hungary, Nigeria, Tunisia, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago. From the 
correlations between the business cycle and leads and lags of broad money, it is possible 
to both assess whether money leads or lags the cycle. Additionally, if money leads the 
cycle, it is important to assess the speed at which changes in money are transmitted to 
economic activity. Firstly, for the developed countries, money leads the cycle in both the 
US and Japan and innovations in money are transmitted fairly quickly; within one quarter 
for Japan and within three quarters for the US. However, broad money appears to lag the 
business cycle in the UK, thus suggesting that money is influenced by output, rather than 
influencing it. Secondly, excluding the countries for which money is countercyclical, this 
relationship is examined for the developing countries. This analysis reveals that money 
leads the cycle for eleven, is synchronous for four and lags the cycle for seven developing 
countries. For all of the countries in which money leads the cycle, monetary innovations 
are transmitted within three quarters.  
To further examine whether money causes output, Granger causality tests of the 
cyclical components of broad money and output were performed. The results provide 
evidence that money causes output in a number of countries, including the US, Japan, 
Brazil, Chile, Côte D’Ivoire, Lithuania, South Africa and South Korea. Conversely, there was 
also evidence that output causes money in several countries; Hungary, Malawi, Turkey 
and Trinidad and Tobago. In all other countries there was no clear pattern of causality. 
However the results were often sensitive to the choice of lags; the results for four and 
eight lags are available in Appendix B. The Granger causality tests and the examination of 
whether money leads or lags the business cycle, provide some evidence to suggest that 
money does influence output in developing countries. Monetary shocks are, therefore, 
important sources of business cycle fluctuations. 
                                                           
10 For example, see Sims (1972, 1980), Christiano and Ljungqvist (1988), Hafer and Kutan (2001) and Rusek 
(2001) 
11 The results of correlations between output and the other monetary aggregates (reserve money, narrow 
money (M1) and quasi money) follow a very similar pattern to those for broad money; consequently this 
analysis follows Agénor et al. (2000) and concentrates solely on broad money. 26 
Following Agénor et al. (2000), the broad money velocity indicator is used to 
examine the velocity of money. The contemporaneous correlations are strongly 
countercyclical for all countries, with the exception of the UK and Mexico. This exactly 
corresponds to the findings of Agénor et al. (2000). 
Another monetary variable which has been found by Agénor et al. (2000) and Rand 
and Tarp (2002) to have an important influence on the business cycle in some developing 
countries is real domestic private sector credit. Since equity markets are weakly 
capitalised in developing countries, relative to the industrialised countries, domestic 
private sector credit is thought to fulfil an important role in determining investment and 
hence economic activity in these countries. From Tables 6(a), (b) and (c) it is apparent 
that there is no clear pattern of cyclicality between output and real domestic private 
sector credit amongst the developing countries. However, it is procyclical for eighteen of 
the thirty-two countries. In the developed countries, where private sector credit should 
play a less important role, it is strongly procyclical. To examine whether credit influences 
output or vice versa, it is necessary to examine whether credit leads or lags the business 
cycle. For the majority of countries credit lags the business cycle, thus suggesting that it is 
fluctuations in output that influence credit. There are just three countries in which credit 
is both procyclical and leads the cycle: Japan, Peru and Nigeria. Granger causality test 
reveal a similar picture, with either no clear pattern of causation or with output causing 
credit; the only two countries for which there is significant evidence that credit causes 
output are Chile and Japan. 
Finally, when considering the impact of monetary policy on the business cycle, it is 
also necessary to examine the relationship between output and interest rates. This 
relationship was not considered in either Agénor et al. (2000) or Rand and Tarp (2002). 
However, Neumeyer and Perri (2005) find real interest rates to be mildly procyclical in 
developed countries and countercyclical in developing countries. This is based on results 
for Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and the Philippines. Similarly, Uribe and Yue (2005) 
find real interest rates to be countercyclical in five developing economies:
12 Argentina, 
Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru. 
Tables 6(a), (b) and (c) report the correlations between output and both the real 
money market rate and the real lending rate. Both real interest rate variables are 
procyclical in the developed countries, and strongly so in the US and Japan. However, the 
results for the developing countries are much more varied. On average real interest rates 
are weakly procyclical in Africa, North Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe and countercyclical 
in Latin America. This countercyclicality of interest rates may be explained by the use of 
interest rates to target inflation during the 1980s and early 1990s, when most of the Latin 
American countries experienced a combination of extremely high inflation rates and slow 
economic growth. Thus, the distinct countercyclical relationship that Neumeyer and Perri 
(2005) and Uribe and Yue (2005) document is not characteristic of most developing 
country business cycles. This finding is particularly significant as there have been several 
recent papers that incorporate this feature into theoretical models of emerging market 
business cycles, including Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue (2005), Aguiar and 
Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). 
                                                           
12 Uribe and Yue (2005) find real interest rates to be acyclical in the Philippines and South Africa, the only 
other developing countries in their sample. 27 
Examining whether the real interest rates lead or lag the cycle, it is evident that 
these lag the cycle by around three quarters in the developed countries, whilst they tend 
to lead the cycle in the North African and Eastern European countries. There is no clear 
pattern amongst the other regions. To further consider whether interest rates cause the 
business cycle, Granger causality tests were used. These revealed that real interest rates 
cause output in one third of the developing countries,
13 whilst being caused by output in 
just four developing countries; for all the other countries, including the developed 
countries, there was no evidence of unidirectional causation. Thus, interest rates do 
appear to be an important source of business cycle movements in developing countries. 
(f) Trade and Exchange Rates 
The final correlation analysis concerns the relationship between the business cycle 
and trade related variables, including the trade balance, the terms of trade and exchange 
rates. Following Agénor et al. (2000), the trade balance is constructed as the ratio of 
exports to imports at current prices. 
Firstly, imports and exports are strongly procyclical in the developed countries, and 
are correspondingly procyclical in the majority of the developing countries. The only 
significant exceptions to this are Chile and India which have weakly and strongly 
countercyclical imports respectively. However, the results for the trade balance are not as 
consistent; for the developed countries and sixteen of the developing countries the trade 
balance is countercyclical, whilst for seven countries it is procyclical, and strongly so in 
Chile, Nigeria and Tunisia. The procyclicality of the trade balance can be explained by the 
strong positive relationship between the business cycle and exports and the acyclicality of 
imports, which in combination will result in a positive trade balance during expansions 
and a negative trade balance during recessions. This is the opposite of the developed 
country case, where expansionary business cycle phases result in increased demand for 
imports and thus a negative trade balance. The close relationship between exports and 
the business cycle in these countries may extend from the implementation of export-led 
or outward-looking development strategies.  
The terms of trade provide an interesting distinction between the developed and the 
developing countries. Terms of trade are countercyclical for the developed countries. 
However, just three of the developing countries are similarly countercyclical (Brazil, 
Morocco and Hong Kong); for the majority the terms of trade are strongly procyclical. This 
is similar to the findings of both Agénor et al. (2000) and Rand and Tarp (2002), although 
for somewhat smaller samples. Agénor et al. (2000) suggest that, under the assumption 
that the developing economies are too small to affect world prices, the procyclical 
relationship may reflect demand shifts that yield simultaneous increases in world prices 
and demand for the country’s exports. As such, both the economy’s terms of trade and 
output would increase. 
The weak relationship between the exchange rate and the rest of the economy is 
well documented in the literature, and is known as the exchange rate disconnect puzzle 
following Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000). Thus, it is unlikely that there will be a clear pattern 
                                                           
13 Brazil, Chile, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, Slovenia, South Africa and Turkey. 28 
of correlations between output and exchange rates for the sample of developing 
countries. However, for completeness this relationship is considered. 
For the developed countries, both the nominal and real effective exchange rates are 
countercyclical, although as expected there is no clear configuration between the 
developing countries. The only distinct pattern that emerges is that for most countries 
both nominal and real exchange rates exhibit the same cyclicality relationship. A similar 
pattern is observed by Agénor et al. (2000).  
 
5.4. Cross-Correlation of Output between Countries 
The final intention of this paper is to examine the degree of business cycle 
synchronisation by measuring pair-wise correlations, both between developing countries 
and between developing and developed countries. There is known to be a close 
relationship between industrialised country business cycles; for example, Backus, Kehoe 
and Kydland (1995) find strong positive correlations between US output and nine other 
industrialised country business cycles.
14 However, the degree of synchronisation for 
developing country cycles is rather more varied. Kose et al. (2003) find that a “world 
factor” explains much of the variation in industrialised country business cycles, whilst 
developing country business cycle fluctuations tend to be country specific, particularly in 
Asia and Africa, and consequently they display little comovement with the rest of the 
world. 
There is reason to believe that the business cycles of developing countries will be 
correlated with the business cycles of their major trading partners and investors. As 
discussed in Aruoba (2001), a procyclical and leading relationship is expected between 
the lender country’s business cycle and the receiving country’s cycle. However, the results 
show no clear relationship between the business cycles of Turkey and its lender countries. 
A similarly procyclical and leading relationship is to be expected between a developing 
country’s cycle and the countries that are the key recipients of its exports. If the 
purchasing country goes into a recession, their import demand will decrease and hence 
the developing country’s exports will decline stimulating the onset of a recession. 
However, Caldéron et al. (2007) find that whilst trade intensity is an important factor in 
increasing business cycle synchronisation amongst the industrialised countries, this is of 
significantly less importance in the synchronisation between developed and developing 
country cycles and between developing country cycles. 
Table 7 details the cross-country correlations, and as expected there is very strong 
synchronisation of the US, UK and Japanese business cycles, whilst the degree of 
synchronisation for the developing countries is rather more varied.  
Examining the correlation between the developed and developing country pairs, 
there is evidence of strong synchronisation for a large proportion of the developing 
countries, particularly within the Latin American and Asian regions. In most cases where 
there is a significant correlation, the developed country is one of the key purchasers of 
the developing country’s exports; for example, throughout the sample period the US was 
the main procurer of Colombia’s exports.  
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Note that numbers marked in bold indicate weak contemporaneous correlation and numbers marked in bold with a * indicate strong contemporaneous correlation 
Table 7. Cross-Correlations of Real Output between Countries 30 
However, examining the degree of synchronisation between developing country 
cycles reveals no clear picture. The results for Africa seem to concur with the findings of 
Kose et al. (2003), namely that fluctuations are country specific. However, the Asian 
countries appear to exhibit strong regional synchronisation, particularly when considering 
only the East Asian countries; the correlations for this sub-sample of countries are 
presented in Table 8. There are also a number of strong correlations between the Latin 
American countries, and particularly between the members of the Latin American Free 
Trade Association.
15  
Table 8.  Cross-Correlations of Real Output between East Asian Countries 
   JP  HK  IN  KO  MY  PH 
JP  .  0.16  0.28*  0.34*  0.48*  0.40* 
HK    .  0.16  0.50*  0.34*  0.32* 
IND      .  0.32*  0.26*  0.24* 
KO        .  0.36*  0.49* 
MY          .  0.43* 
PH            . 
Finally, the patterns of business cycle synchronisation observed in this analysis are 
compared to those found using the concordance statistic in Male (2010). This reveals that 
whilst no country pair with a significant concordance statistic is found to have an 
insignificant correlation in this analysis, a large number of the strong procyclical 
correlations observed in Table 7 are not similarly significant in the concordance analysis. 
In particular, referring to the East Asian countries in Table 8, the only significant 
concordance statistics are between India and South Korea and between Malaysia and the 
Philippines. Thus, this suggests that the concordance statistic is a much more robust 
measure of business cycle synchronisation and furthermore, that observed patterns of 
business cycle synchronisation clearly depend on the choice of business cycle definition. 
 
6 CONCLUSION  AND  SUMMARY OF STYLISED FACTS 
Identifying the characteristics and statistical properties (or stylised facts) of business 
cycles is essential as these often form the basis for the construction and validation of 
theoretical business cycle models. Furthermore, understanding the cyclical patterns in 
economic activity, and their causes, is important to the decisions of both policymakers 
and market participants. However, whilst there have been a number of research papers 
examining these stylised facts in the context of developing countries (e.g. Agénor et al., 
2000; Rand and Tarp, 2002; Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Aguar and Gopinath, 2007), these 
have been based on very small samples and the results have consequently been 
subjective and dependent on the countries chosen for inclusion in the study.  
Motivated by the importance of the stylised facts and the lack of consistency 
amongst previous researchers, this paper has made a significant contribution to the 
literature by both generalising the developing country stylised facts for a much larger 
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sample of thirty-two countries, and constructing a more comprehensive set of stylised 
facts. The stylised facts emerging from this study are summarised below. 
Firstly, output is on average twice as volatile in developing than developed 
countries. This contradicts the finding of Rand and Tarp (2002) who state that output is 
no more than 20% more volatile in developing countries. 
Secondly, with the exception of the Latin American countries, the volatility of prices 
and wages are similar to those of the developed countries.  There is no clear pattern of 
either pro- or countercyclicality of either prices or inflation amongst the developing 
countries. There is, however, a tendency for those developing countries with 
countercyclical CPI to also exhibit countercyclical inflation and vice versa. This is a 
significant difference from the pattern of procyclical inflation and countercyclical prices 
observed in the industrialised countries. Real wages, however, are procyclical for both 
developing and developed countries. 
Thirdly, consumption and investment are significantly more volatile than in 
developed countries. Consumption is on average 30% more volatile than output, whilst 
investment is between two and four times more volatile than output. Both investment 
and consumption are procyclical, as observed in developed countries. The findings for 
consumption and investment are consistent with the previous literature. 
Fourthly, government revenue and expenditure are significantly more volatile than 
in developed countries, and they are, on average, four times more volatile than output. 
There is less consistency in the correlation analysis; however the fiscal impulse is 
significantly countercyclical for the majority of the developing country correlations, which 
implies that fiscal policy is having a stabilising effect on business cycle fluctuations. 
Fifthly, real interest rates are, on average, less volatile than in the developed 
countries; this is the opposite of the finding of Neumeyer and Perri (2005). On average 
real interest rates are weakly procyclical in Africa, North Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe 
and countercyclical in Latin America. Thus, the distinct countercyclical relationship that 
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2005) document is not characteristic of 
most developing country business cycles. This finding is particularly significant as there 
have been several recent papers that incorporate this feature into theoretical models of 
emerging market business cycles, including Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue 
(2005), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). 
Sixthly, broad money is, on average, procyclical in developed countries and either 
weakly procyclical or acyclical in developing countries. There is evidence that money leads 
the business cycle in a number of developing countries, suggesting that money does 
influence output in developing countries, and thus that monetary shocks are important 
sources of business cycle fluctuations. The broad money velocity indicator is strongly 
countercyclical in all the developing countries, except Mexico, exactly corresponding to 
the findings of Agénor et al. (2000). 
Seventhly, real private sector domestic credit is procyclical in most developing 
countries, as by Agénor et al. (2000) and Rand and Tarp (2002). However, it tends to lag 
rather than lead the business cycle, thus suggesting that it is fluctuations in output that 
influence credit rather than credit influencing the business cycle.  
Eighthly, output fluctuations in developing countries are positively correlated with 
economic activity in the main industrialised countries, as proxied by world output and 32 
world real interest rate. Findings for both of world output and world real interest rate are 
consistent with Agénor et al. (2000). Furthermore, examining the correlation between the 
developed and developing country pairs, there is evidence of strong synchronisation for a 
large proportion of the developing countries, particularly within the Latin American and 
Asian regions. 
Ninthly, imports and exports are strongly procyclical in the developed countries and 
are correspondingly procyclical in the developing countries. However, there is no 
consistent relationship with the trade balance. The terms of trade provide an interesting 
distinction between the developed and the developing countries, being countercyclical 
for the developed countries and strongly procyclical for the majority of developing 
countries. This is similar to the findings of both Agénor et al. (2000) and Rand and Tarp 
(2002), although for somewhat smaller samples. 
Tenthly, nominal and real effective exchange rates are countercyclical in developed 
countries. However, there is no clear configuration between the developing countries. 
The only distinct pattern that emerges is that for most countries both nominal and real 
exchange rates exhibit the same cyclicality relationship. A similar pattern is observed by 
Agénor et al. (2000). However, fluctuations in real exchange rates are persistent and 
volatile, which is consistent with the findings for the developed countries. 
Finally, a central characteristic of developed country business cycles that has 
concerned macroeconomists in recent years is the persistence of output fluctuations. This 
analysis has found that the developing country business cycles are also characterised by 
significantly persistent output fluctuations. The magnitude of this persistence is, however, 
somewhat lower than for the developed countries. Furthermore, prices and nominal 
wages are significantly persistent in developing countries. This finding is important, 
because it justifies the use of theoretical models with staggered prices and wages for the 
modelling of developing country business cycles. 
Together with the business cycle characteristics identified in Male (2010), these act 
to extend the existing knowledge of developing country business cycles and provide a 
significant generalisation of the stylised facts. This is important both for use in 
subsequent theoretical modelling and to inform the decisions of policymakers and market 
participants alike.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
A.1. COUNTRY CODES 
AG  =  Argentina  JP  =  Japan  RM =  Romania 
BB  =  Barbados  KO  =  Korea, South  SA  =  South Africa 
BG  =  Bangladesh  LT  =  Lithuania  SG  =  Senegal 
BR  =  Brazil  MC =  Morocco  SJ  =  Slovenia 
CB  =  Columbia  MI  =  Malawi  SX  =  Slovak Republic 
CL  =  Chile  MK =  Macedonia  TK  =  Turkey 
HK  =  Hong Kong  MX =  Mexico  TT  =  Trinidad and Tobago 
HN =  Hungary  MY =  Malaysia  TU  =  Tunisia 
IN  =  India  NG  =  Nigeria  UG  =  Uruguay 
IS  =  Israel  PE  =  Peru  UK  =  United Kingdom 
IV  =  Cote d'Ivoire  PH  =  Philippines  US  =  United States 
JO  =  Jordan  PK  =  Pakistan 
 
A.2. DATA 
Table A.1    Variable Name Codes and IMF IFS Series Codes 36 
APPENDIX B 
 
B.1. CROSS-CORRELATIONS WITH LEADS AND LAGS  
Table B.1  
Correlation between Real Domestic Output and World Real Output and World Real Interest Rate 
World Output  World Real Interest Rate 
lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8  lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8 
US  -0.508  -0.150  0.778  0.479  -0.214  -0.243  0.168  0.554  0.315  -0.011 
UK  -0.507  -0.133  0.605  0.385  -0.045  -0.385  0.209  0.440  0.221  -0.047 
Japan  -0.353  -0.109  0.815  0.370  -0.438  -0.006  0.281  0.351  0.058  -0.029 
Africa       
Côte d'Ivoire  0.031  0.023  0.009  0.153  0.141  -0.132  0.046  0.235  0.187  0.066 
Malawi  -0.053  0.144  0.127  0.050  -0.197  0.149  -0.015  -0.015  -0.012  -0.110 
Nigeria  0.205  0.140  0.298  0.042  -0.137  0.078  0.372  0.113  -0.440  -0.661 
South Africa  0.154  0.150  0.170  -0.126  -0.271  0.424  0.177  0.182  -0.159  -0.173 
Senegal  0.547  0.716  0.502  -0.113  -0.435  -0.270  0.734  -0.403  -0.699  -0.275 
North Africa       
Israel  -0.069  -0.104  0.043  0.145  -0.007  -0.137  0.008  0.238  0.153  0.017 
Jordan  0.023  0.240  -0.035  -0.552  0.278  -0.020  0.203  0.729  -0.483  -0.147 
Morocco  -0.040  -0.011  0.195  0.187  -0.086  -0.007  0.075  0.083  -0.004  -0.115 
Tunisia  -0.041  0.494  0.341  0.009  -0.094  0.228  0.411  0.181  0.046  -0.099 
Latin America       
Argentina  -0.067  -0.456  0.614  0.510  0.083  -0.064  -0.014  0.200  0.639  0.622 
Barbados  -0.130  0.202  0.447  0.239  0.081  0.035  0.250  0.278  0.236  -0.038 
Brazil  -0.145  0.024  0.557  -0.563  -0.465  0.692  0.260  -0.070  -0.377  -0.305 
Columbia  -0.171  -0.062  0.279  -0.092  0.126  -0.170  -0.166  0.037  0.145  0.201 
Chile  -0.289  0.077  0.602  0.208  -0.143  -0.083  0.110  0.308  0.173  0.055 
Mexico  0.242  0.406  0.329  -0.154  -0.520  0.300  0.216  0.131  -0.003  -0.193 
Peru  -0.369  -0.539  0.258  0.158  -0.255  -0.170  -0.161  0.130  0.127  0.058 
Trinidad  0.075  0.033  0.171  -0.134  0.044  -0.137  -0.006  0.109  -0.093  0.114 
Uruguay  0.265  0.238  0.334  0.050  -0.112  0.253  0.042  0.248  0.187  0.094 
Asia       
Bangladesh  -0.318  -0.225  0.071  -0.102  -0.033  -0.269  -0.025  -0.166  0.014  0.128 
Hong Kong  -0.074  -0.285  0.224  0.150  0.090  0.190  -0.019  0.350  0.084  -0.125 
India  -0.161  0.183  0.540  0.324  0.048  0.064  0.441  0.467  -0.021  -0.265 
Korea, South  -0.197  -0.252  0.214  0.341  -0.040  -0.161  0.038  0.237  -0.004  -0.053 
Malaysia  -0.283  -0.178  0.429  0.258  -0.072  -0.002  0.238  0.182  0.037  0.044 
Philippines  -0.186  -0.225  0.093  0.025  -0.253  0.086  0.055  -0.236  -0.184  0.055 
Pakistan  -0.179  0.287  0.152  -0.199  -0.229  -0.115  0.192  -0.016  -0.042  0.037 
Turkey  -0.052  0.068  0.164  0.075  0.042  -0.102  0.099  -0.097  0.178  0.501 
East Europe       
Hungary  -0.327  -0.138  0.352  0.413  0.264  0.022  0.322  0.476  0.332  -0.107 
Lithuania  -0.051  0.207  0.195  -0.269  0.214  -0.101  -0.144  0.229  0.192  -0.195 
Macedonia  0.297  -0.089  0.115  0.144  -0.122  0.045  0.236  -0.196  -0.058  0.308 
Romania  -0.322  -0.013  0.230  0.291  0.221  0.165  0.247  0.138  0.050  -0.028 
Slovenia  -0.217  -0.048  0.361  -0.253  -0.389  0.206  -0.135  0.124  -0.064  -0.338 
Slovak Republic  -0.274  -0.104  0.114  -0.492  0.180  -0.027  -0.134  -0.136  -0.298  0.018 
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Table B.2 
Correlation between Real Domestic Output and Prices, Inflation and Real Wages 
CPI  Inflation  Real Wage 
lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8  lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8  lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8 
US  -0.172  -0.714  -0.465  0.238  0.556  -0.509  -0.477  0.270  0.573  0.185  …  …  …  …  … 
UK  0.111  -0.459  -0.514  -0.049  0.441  -0.221  -0.392  0.230  0.302  0.227  …  …  …  …  … 
Japan  0.018  -0.642  -0.351  0.217  0.108  -0.341  -0.328  0.430  0.191  -0.163  …  …  …  …  … 
Africa          
Côte d'Ivoire  0.006  0.012  0.165  0.262  0.111  -0.019  -0.002  0.082  0.130  -0.174  …  …  …  …  … 
Malawi  0.279  0.327  -0.235  -0.388  -0.264  0.135  -0.065  -0.409  -0.070  0.147  …  …  …  …  … 
Nigeria  0.165  0.053  -0.256  -0.227  -0.098  -0.123  -0.030  -0.216  0.046  0.149  …  …  …  …  … 
South Africa  -0.033  -0.196  -0.120  0.200  0.151  -0.048  -0.087  0.117  0.169  -0.096  …  …  …  …  … 
Senegal  -0.054  0.230  0.116  -0.269  -0.035  -0.016  0.141  0.020  -0.315  0.057  …  …  …  …  … 
North Africa          
Israel  0.073  0.267  0.190  0.174  -0.015  0.443  0.211  -0.426  -0.102  0.261  …  …  …  …  … 
Jordan  0.033  0.016  -0.158  -0.234  0.017  -0.047  -0.050  -0.143  -0.046  0.102  …  …  …  …  … 
Morocco  -0.039  -0.070  -0.236  0.031  -0.002  0.031  -0.063  -0.074  0.105  0.071  …  …  …  …  … 
Tunisia  0.119  0.674  -0.149  -0.378  -0.142  0.421  0.213  -0.432  -0.097  0.083  …  …  …  …  … 
Latin America          
Argentina  -0.323  0.068  0.595  -0.632  -0.267  0.081  0.113  0.239  -0.811  0.213  …  …  …  …  … 
Barbados  0.204  -0.012  -0.443  -0.201  0.208  -0.008  -0.041  -0.124  0.166  0.280  …  …  …  …  … 
Brazil  -0.164  0.081  0.421  0.350  0.149  -0.010  -0.008  0.400  0.275  0.317  …  …  …  …  … 
Columbia  -0.171  -0.345  -0.302  0.147  0.118  -0.101  -0.046  0.225  0.094  -0.007  …  …  …  …  … 
Chile  0.163  -0.138  -0.009  -0.025  -0.105  0.028  -0.344  -0.130  -0.100  0.442  0.041  0.371  -0.048  0.303  0.118 
Mexico  0.011  -0.083  -0.330  -0.332  -0.010  0.251  -0.021  -0.516  -0.070  0.139  -0.115  -0.151  0.277  0.312  0.100 
Peru  -0.085  -0.423  -0.387  -0.357  -0.076  -0.286  -0.076  -0.045  0.057  0.099  …  …  …  …  … 
Trinidad  0.082  -0.055  -0.217  -0.208  -0.087  0.057  -0.110  -0.146  0.016  0.080  …  …  …  …  … 
Uruguay  0.043  -0.307  -0.135  0.107  -0.147  0.312  0.352  -0.041  -0.444  -0.182  …  …  …  …  … 
Asia          
Bangladesh  -0.035  -0.090  0.055  0.061  -0.061  0.006  -0.014  0.117  -0.049  0.060  …  …  …  …  … 
Hong Kong  0.871  -0.696  0.074  -0.176  -0.582  -0.446  -0.540  0.275  -0.427  -0.113  -0.869  -0.621  0.405  0.751  0.683 
India  0.048  -0.197  -0.398  -0.151  0.160  -0.084  -0.157  -0.099  0.265  0.179  …  …  …  …  … 
Korea, South  0.143  -0.164  -0.482  -0.192  0.238  0.061  -0.300  -0.248  0.457  0.288  …  …  …  …  … 
Malaysia  -0.036  -0.186  -0.071  -0.007  -0.031  -0.103  -0.059  0.150  0.039  0.042  …  …  …  …  … 
Philippines  -0.120  -0.192  0.047  0.086  -0.080  -0.180  -0.079  0.127  0.060  -0.152  …  …  …  …  … 
Pakistan  -0.340  -0.144  0.132  0.278  0.006  -0.264  0.191  0.238  0.111  -0.206  …  …  …  …  … 
Turkey  -0.038  -0.014  -0.132  -0.192  0.079  0.079  0.048  -0.261  -0.039  0.008  …  …  …  …  … 
East Europe          
Hungary  -0.017  -0.680  -0.591  -0.090  0.251  -0.338  -0.374  0.176  0.411  0.183  0.034  0.413  0.297  -0.122  -0.225 
Lithuania  -0.152  -0.141  -0.095  -0.032  0.041  0.121  0.019  0.028  -0.310  -0.233  …  …  …  …  … 
Macedonia  -0.157  -0.341  -0.253  0.031  0.330  0.138  -0.109  0.455  0.192  0.150  -0.276  0.579  0.244  -0.230  -0.394 
Romania  0.612  -0.211  -0.617  -0.352  0.143  -0.137  -0.600  -0.278  0.243  0.345  -0.311  0.486  0.557  0.182  -0.134 
Slovenia  0.077  0.097  0.579  0.337  0.061  0.082  -0.309  0.557  -0.340  -0.209  -0.245  -0.487  0.336  0.186  0.323 
Slovak Republic  0.153  0.558  0.130  -0.476  -0.307  0.270  -0.039  -0.460  -0.406  0.099  -0.513  -0.450  0.000  0.539  0.430 
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Table B.3 
Correlation between Real Domestic Output and Consumption and Investment 
Real Private Consumption  Real Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8  lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8 
US  -0.113  0.617  0.675  -0.097  -0.493  -0.239  0.383  0.869  0.146  -0.500 
UK  -0.323  0.152  0.518  0.264  -0.001  -0.327  0.032  0.510  0.494  0.007 
Japan  -0.238  0.425  0.368  -0.084  -0.126  -0.506  0.056  0.764  0.338  -0.106 
Africa       
Côte d'Ivoire  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Malawi  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Nigeria  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
South Africa  -0.508  0.039  0.564  0.332  0.183  -0.619  -0.060  0.631  0.605  0.108 
Senegal  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
North Africa       
Israel  0.056  -0.065  0.250  0.100  -0.141  -0.010  -0.011  0.374  -0.060  -0.398 
Jordan  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Morocco  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Tunisia  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Latin America       
Argentina  -0.359  -0.187  0.707  0.685  -0.407  -0.121  0.206  0.897  0.474  -0.551 
Barbados  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Brazil  -0.112  -0.281  0.488  -0.061  0.071  -0.080  -0.309  0.642  -0.116  -0.262 
Columbia  0.000  0.174  0.643  -0.298  -0.203  -0.397  0.013  0.666  -0.211  -0.074 
Chile  0.781  -0.271  0.224  -0.574  0.876  0.152  0.853  -0.954  0.142  0.720 
Mexico  -0.246  -0.230  0.563  0.290  0.081  -0.324  -0.109  0.802  0.218  -0.067 
Peru  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  -0.152  0.166  0.771  0.355  -0.066 
Trinidad  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Uruguay  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Asia       
Bangladesh  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Hong Kong  -0.379  0.118  0.625  -0.002  -0.412  -0.253  -0.032  0.622  0.123  -0.239 
India  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Korea, South  -0.372  -0.280  0.322  0.414  0.179  -0.445  -0.163  0.469  0.434  0.035 
Malaysia  0.030  -0.168  -0.316  0.025  0.065  -0.147  -0.629  -0.064  0.321  0.311 
Philippines  -0.071  0.100  0.016  -0.014  0.181  -0.158  0.099  0.203  0.007  -0.057 
Pakistan  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Turkey  0.122  -0.111  0.665  -0.008  -0.072  0.072  -0.235  0.789  0.095  -0.074 
East Europe       
Hungary  -0.176  0.322  -0.301  -0.379  0.554  0.366  0.199  0.008  -0.089  -0.075 
Lithuania  0.285  0.079  0.287  -0.177  -0.441  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Macedonia  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Romania  -0.534  -0.587  -0.105  0.102  0.225  -0.640  0.294  0.845  0.634  0.051 
Slovenia  0.460  0.260  -0.587  -0.016  -0.135  0.221  0.317  -0.633  -0.139  -0.017 




Correlation between Real Domestic Output and Government Expenditure, Government Revenue 
and the Fiscal Impulse 
Government Expenditure  Government Revenue  Fiscal Impulse 
lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8  lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8  lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8 
US  0.005  -0.193  -0.414  0.029  0.221  -0.481  -0.191  0.594  0.451  0.031  0.364  0.033  -0.695  -0.332  0.103 
UK  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Japan  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Africa          
Côte d'Ivoire  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Malawi  -0.134  -0.064  0.092  0.003  0.097  0.047  -0.123  0.032  -0.133  -0.176  -0.135  0.016  0.076  0.057  0.150 
Nigeria  0.111  -0.095  -0.547  0.239  0.237  0.219  -0.410  0.094  0.076  -0.244  -0.042  0.346  -0.254  0.118  -0.060 
South Africa  -0.146  -0.115  0.040  0.149  0.057  0.012  -0.176  -0.431  -0.023  0.164  0.060  -0.165  -0.282  -0.136  0.142 
Senegal  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
North Africa          
Israel  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Jordan  -0.070  0.157  -0.159  0.123  0.032  0.000  0.373  -0.701  0.416  0.143  -0.150  0.273  -0.280  0.150  0.091 
Morocco  -0.199  0.212  0.288  -0.258  -0.174  -0.145  0.262  0.237  -0.215  -0.136  -0.613  0.030  0.130  -0.309  0.525 
Tunisia  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Latin America          
Argentina  -0.457  0.106  0.737  0.124  -0.392  0.197  0.269  0.710  -0.174  -0.521  -0.379  -0.491  -0.386  0.348  0.348 
Barbados  -0.165  0.070  0.202  0.131  0.030  -0.113  0.131  0.195  0.149  -0.098  -0.037  -0.046  0.020  -0.004  0.093 
Brazil  -0.023  0.301  0.505  0.065  -0.467  -0.036  0.265  0.525  0.053  -0.468  0.019  0.228  -0.143  0.056  0.104 
Columbia  -0.149  0.076  0.349  -0.373  0.129  -0.185  -0.184  0.167  -0.044  0.272  0.040  0.182  0.119  -0.208  -0.065 
Chile  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Mexico  0.300  0.141  -0.113  -0.277  0.052  0.083  -0.221  -0.311  -0.087  0.245  -0.125  -0.177  -0.093  -0.018  0.119 
Peru  -0.089  -0.455  -0.234  -0.328  -0.441  -0.102  0.322  0.152  0.205  -0.190  -0.096  0.167  -0.097  0.117  0.248 
Trinidad  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Uruguay  -0.323  -0.055  0.357  0.100  -0.153  -0.048  -0.364  -0.370  -0.043  0.233  -0.025  -0.432  -0.213  -0.066  0.257 
Asia          
Bangladesh  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Hong Kong  0.237  -0.230  -0.205  0.107  0.094  0.394  -0.087  -0.580  0.079  0.258  0.181  0.090  -0.320  0.025  -0.008 
India  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Korea, South  -0.191  -0.037  -0.040  0.062  0.169  -0.111  -0.031  -0.391  0.070  0.254  -0.072  0.009  -0.280  -0.057  0.095 
Malaysia  -0.004  -0.292  -0.211  0.043  0.153  0.166  -0.235  -0.684  0.002  0.294  0.261  -0.062  -0.318  -0.076  0.110 
Philippines  -0.122  -0.082  -0.025  -0.027  0.045  0.255  -0.053  -0.887  -0.096  0.292  0.051  0.027  -0.198  -0.104  0.022 
Pakistan  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Turkey  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
East Europe          
Hungary  0.207  0.139  -0.633  -0.138  0.529  0.302  0.211  -0.866  -0.248  0.599  0.479  0.101  -0.607  -0.191  0.446 
Lithuania  -0.435  -0.959  0.440  0.747  0.882  -0.480  -0.747  -0.899  -0.387  0.436  -0.449  -0.805  0.648  0.174  0.823 
Macedonia  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Romania  0.661  0.218  -0.022  -0.087  -0.146  -0.146  -0.171  0.097  0.298  -0.100  -0.291  0.203  0.435  0.214  -0.552 
Slovenia  -0.251  -0.258  0.272  0.459  -0.062  0.131  -0.061  -0.641  0.313  0.095  0.059  0.042  0.165  0.004  -0.167 
Slovak Republic  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
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Table B.5 
Correlation between Real Domestic Output and Broad Money and the Broad Money Velocity 
Indicator 
Broad Money  Broad Money Velocity Indicator 
lag8  lag4  no lag  lead4  lead8  lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8 
US  0.017  0.392  0.026  -0.230  -0.096  0.478  0.297  -0.690  -0.393  0.116 
UK  -0.230  -0.077  0.102  0.195  0.296  -0.149  -0.025  -0.143  0.307  0.501 
Japan  -0.342  0.255  0.388  -0.012  0.016  0.277  0.359  -0.681  -0.205  0.414 
Africa    
Côte d'Ivoire  0.329  0.192  0.196  0.098  -0.192  0.454  0.129  -0.735  -0.065  -0.029 
Malawi  -0.289  0.222  0.071  -0.124  0.301  0.163  -0.207  -0.534  0.108  0.129 
Nigeria  0.108  -0.124  -0.291  -0.139  0.000  -0.012  -0.267  -0.527  0.080  0.131 
South Africa  -0.693  -0.177  0.466  0.575  0.340  -0.347  -0.354  -0.540  0.206  0.541 
Senegal  -0.042  0.081  0.099  -0.313  0.189  0.230  0.151  -0.873  0.164  0.382 
North Africa    
Israel  0.202  0.080  0.115  -0.126  -0.041  0.121  -0.239  -0.493  -0.017  0.206 
Jordan  0.345  -0.021  -0.015  -0.158  -0.132  0.153  0.344  -0.909  0.436  0.135 
Morocco  -0.149  0.059  0.098  -0.027  0.057  -0.059  0.263  -0.663  0.151  0.063 
Tunisia  0.054  -0.283  -0.173  0.154  0.237  0.083  -0.177  -0.534  0.639  -0.097 
Latin America    
Argentina  -0.357  -0.020  0.617  0.258  -0.281  -0.371  -0.183  -0.794  0.597  0.364 
Barbados  -0.222  0.316  0.111  -0.052  0.291  0.014  0.145  -0.692  0.074  0.255 
Brazil  0.046  0.279  0.388  0.006  -0.329  0.189  0.235  -0.592  0.409  0.141 
Columbia  -0.268  -0.471  0.040  0.260  0.194  -0.107  -0.194  -0.481  0.188  0.176 
Chile  -0.549  -0.177  0.447  0.592  0.045  0.052  -0.307  -0.518  0.604  0.424 
Mexico  0.023  0.093  -0.029  -0.063  0.096  -0.075  0.056  0.015  0.134  0.133 
Peru  -0.078  -0.338  -0.420  -0.476  -0.019  -0.006  0.184  -0.678  -0.211  0.475 
Trinidad  0.106  -0.014  -0.177  -0.343  -0.067  0.069  0.129  -0.833  0.025  0.026 
Uruguay  -0.274  0.182  0.332  0.136  -0.021  -0.090  -0.269  -0.398  -0.073  0.480 
Asia    
Bangladesh  -0.070  0.044  0.201  -0.160  -0.214  0.198  0.398  -0.588  0.093  -0.294 
Hong Kong  0.013  0.521  0.732  -0.185  -0.885  0.139  0.711  -0.606  -0.431  0.466 
India  -0.070  -0.063  -0.018  0.031  0.214  0.019  -0.029  -0.162  0.024  0.200 
Korea, South  -0.063  0.397  0.430  0.094  -0.189  0.004  0.094  -0.442  0.061  0.066 
Malaysia  -0.162  -0.127  0.038  -0.049  -0.207  0.282  -0.039  -0.906  -0.050  0.254 
Philippines  -0.256  0.017  0.167  0.087  0.004  0.268  -0.024  -0.926  -0.072  0.307 
Pakistan  0.189  0.270  -0.081  -0.211  -0.009  0.374  0.219  -0.570  -0.214  0.064 
Turkey  -0.100  0.156  -0.372  0.097  0.273  -0.250  0.165  -0.776  0.210  0.213 
East Europe    
Hungary  0.679  0.120  -0.565  -0.711  0.128  0.473  0.013  -0.838  -0.637  0.104 
Lithuania  -0.335  -0.418  0.407  -0.316  -0.235  0.013  0.217  -0.935  0.331  0.426 
Macedonia  -0.289  0.222  0.071  -0.124  0.301  -0.232  0.561  -0.354  0.006  0.191 
Romania  0.536  0.379  0.065  -0.263  -0.504  0.255  -0.573  -0.855  -0.070  0.683 
Slovenia  0.158  0.076  0.304  0.482  0.033  0.074  0.093  -0.561  0.626  0.150 
Slovak Republic  -0.057  0.212  0.383  0.153  -0.237  0.061  -0.109  -0.594  0.465  0.130 
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Table B.6 
Correlation between Real Domestic Output and Credit 
Real Domestic Credit  Nominal Domestic Credit 
lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8  lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8 
US  -0.342  0.184  0.771  0.482  -0.213  -0.476  -0.164  0.655  0.670  0.044 
UK  -0.314  -0.030  0.234  0.152  0.093  -0.245  -0.134  0.063  0.112  0.210 
Japan  -0.255  0.529  0.362  -0.121  -0.024  -0.365  0.120  0.180  0.052  0.071 
Africa    
Côte d'Ivoire  0.084  0.065  -0.136  0.065  0.000  0.105  0.074  0.009  0.248  0.094 
Malawi  -0.139  -0.108  0.245  0.335  0.143  0.017  -0.002  0.059  0.209  0.034 
Nigeria  -0.122  -0.028  0.109  0.086  0.036  -0.081  0.126  -0.056  -0.186  -0.037 
South Africa  -0.658  -0.275  0.394  0.391  0.167  0.199  0.069  -0.200  -0.028  0.055 
Senegal  0.179  -0.080  -0.177  0.132  0.062  -0.664  -0.350  0.367  0.471  0.225 
North Africa    
Israel  -0.049  -0.349  0.042  0.282  0.243  -0.018  0.227  0.219  0.161  0.038 
Jordan  -0.098  0.127  -0.061  0.215  0.091  0.209  0.238  -0.200  -0.032  0.065 
Morocco  0.054  0.054  -0.057  -0.055  0.014  0.043  0.024  -0.134  -0.044  0.011 
Tunisia  -0.359  -0.230  0.298  -0.119  0.228  -0.041  -0.280  -0.194  -0.149  0.064 
Latin America    
Argentina  -0.604  -0.725  0.177  0.868  0.433  -0.347  -0.250  0.208  0.473  0.302 
Barbados  -0.317  -0.106  0.354  0.370  -0.078  -0.255  -0.182  0.225  0.318  -0.002 
Brazil  0.089  0.095  0.281  0.532  -0.448  0.025  0.333  0.476  0.066  -0.456 
Columbia  -0.189  -0.339  0.094  0.321  0.146  -0.262  -0.471  -0.017  0.378  0.205 
Chile  -0.169  -0.476  -0.143  0.353  0.118  -0.495  -0.422  0.112  0.398  0.115 
Mexico  -0.298  -0.015  0.471  0.367  -0.149  -0.223  -0.072  0.217  0.270  -0.077 
Peru  0.077  0.264  0.174  0.284  0.523  -0.088  -0.435  -0.418  -0.368  0.009 
Trinidad  0.063  0.061  0.019  -0.096  -0.065  0.135  0.061  -0.086  -0.218  -0.091 
Uruguay  0.005  -0.191  -0.196  0.065  0.422  -0.181  0.243  0.036  0.102  0.201 
Asia    
Bangladesh  0.292  -0.151  0.333  0.172  0.101  -0.101  -0.259  0.024  0.061  0.048 
Hong Kong  -0.499  -0.772  0.289  0.699  -0.463  -0.340  -0.568  0.330  0.362  -0.234 
India  -0.026  0.171  0.437  0.112  -0.223  0.026  0.176  0.225  -0.075  -0.206 
Korea, South  -0.351  -0.320  0.187  0.268  0.049  -0.073  -0.064  -0.025  0.178  0.183 
Malaysia  -0.261  -0.496  -0.108  0.226  0.431  -0.232  -0.521  -0.124  0.206  0.336 
Philippines  -0.364  -0.087  0.259  0.385  0.181  -0.016  0.102  0.057  -0.052  -0.120 
Pakistan  0.218  0.189  0.000  -0.151  -0.142  -0.467  -0.205  0.299  0.375  0.129 
Turkey  -0.224  -0.126  0.651  0.400  -0.123  -0.175  -0.086  0.538  0.411  -0.022 
East Europe    
Hungary  -0.614  -0.132  0.415  0.050  0.006  -0.496  -0.404  0.293  0.216  0.237 
Lithuania  -0.354  -0.300  0.239  0.228  -0.075  -0.259  -0.354  0.135  0.183  -0.095 
Macedonia  -0.173  -0.227  0.207  0.026  -0.137  -0.061  -0.357  0.111  0.038  -0.010 
Romania  0.007  -0.705  -0.422  0.834  0.863  0.280  -0.732  -0.434  0.851  0.563 
Slovenia  0.157  0.141  -0.272  0.112  -0.134  -0.146  -0.354  -0.480  -0.176  0.521 
Slovak Republic  -0.155  -0.404  -0.460  -0.082  0.549  0.322  0.198  0.031  0.236  -0.165 
 42 
Table B.7 
Correlation between Real Domestic Output and the Real Interest Rate 
Real Money Market Rate  Real Lending Rate 
lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8  lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8 
US  -0.410  -0.188  0.583  0.543  0.069  -0.440  -0.300  0.577  0.555  -0.002 
UK  -0.500  -0.376  0.123  0.551  0.482  -0.461  -0.462  0.206  0.555  0.419 
Japan  -0.032  -0.464  0.310  0.318  0.003  -0.525  -0.322  0.237  0.348  0.296 
Africa       
Côte d'Ivoire  0.134  -0.049  0.099  -0.064  -0.069  -0.038  -0.136  0.226  -0.076  -0.131 
Malawi  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.061  -0.099  -0.260  -0.153  0.242 
Nigeria  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  -0.124  0.033  0.375  0.277  0.263 
South Africa  -0.529  -0.551  0.153  0.513  0.346  -0.560  -0.561  0.132  0.497  0.290 
Senegal  0.503  0.479  0.573  0.350  0.441  -0.592  0.557  0.448  -0.483  -0.167 
North Africa       
Israel  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.214  -0.133  -0.024  -0.221  -0.178 
Jordan  0.331  -0.343  0.172  0.144  -0.465  0.058  0.127  0.350  -0.330  0.009 
Morocco  -0.163  -0.178  0.178  -0.138  0.008  0.073  0.133  0.034  0.276  0.071 
Tunisia  -0.271  0.226  0.430  -0.423  0.113  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Latin America       
Argentina  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.368  -0.208  -0.802  -0.332  0.439 
Barbados  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  -0.261  -0.198  0.201  0.424  0.142 
Brazil  0.798  -0.166  -0.760  0.034  0.300  0.609  -0.282  -0.739  0.346  0.734 
Columbia  0.156  -0.399  0.300  0.325  -0.325  0.273  -0.380  0.274  0.445  -0.515 
Chile  0.313  -0.311  -0.316  0.331  -0.079  0.035  -0.588  -0.218  -0.073  -0.139 
Mexico  0.248  -0.037  -0.467  0.095  0.083  0.238  0.004  -0.475  0.144  0.165 
Peru  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  -0.621  -0.246  -0.337  -0.076  0.356 
Trinidad  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.180  -0.158  -0.069  -0.012  0.195 
Uruguay  -0.167  -0.159  0.313  -0.172  -0.252  0.521  -0.007  -0.362  -0.218  -0.119 
Asia       
Bangladesh  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.272  -0.109  0.060  -0.167  -0.031 
Hong Kong  -0.198  0.104  0.106  0.210  0.026  -0.114  0.297  0.328  -0.523  -0.362 
India  -0.517  -0.163  0.416  0.174  -0.140  -0.349  -0.468  0.042  0.434  0.218 
Korea, South  0.068  -0.431  -0.296  0.399  0.248  0.264  -0.295  -0.357  0.337  0.259 
Malaysia  -0.430  -0.118  0.805  0.086  -0.459  -0.296  -0.266  0.749  0.163  -0.408 
Philippines  -0.208  -0.186  0.231  0.097  -0.145  -0.225  -0.257  0.077  0.338  0.007 
Pakistan  -0.010  -0.011  -0.003  0.065  -0.020  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Turkey  0.037  -0.129  -0.217  0.179  -0.099  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
East Europe       
Hungary  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  -0.338  -0.504  -0.010  0.299  -0.197 
Lithuania  0.017  -0.107  -0.121  0.477  0.135  0.018  0.151  -0.023  0.442  0.379 
Macedonia  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  -0.092  0.287  0.089  0.100  0.403 
Romania  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Slovenia  0.087  0.159  -0.044  -0.118  -0.341  -0.343  -0.216  0.253  -0.139  -0.266 
Slovak Republic  -0.444  0.381  0.220  0.763  -0.364  -0.892  -0.532  0.448  -0.266  0.788 
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Table B.8 
Correlation between Real Domestic Output and Imports and Exports 
Imports  Exports 
lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8  lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8 
US  -0.353  -0.223  0.583  0.356  -0.071  -0.498  -0.512  0.247  0.544  0.295 
UK  -0.243  -0.192  0.471  0.223  -0.204  -0.123  -0.219  0.230  0.171  -0.081 
Japan  -0.438  -0.051  0.621  0.364  -0.218  -0.422  0.365  0.422  0.446  0.017 
Africa       
Côte d'Ivoire  0.397  0.016  0.091  0.142  0.323  0.238  0.026  -0.191  -0.013  0.037 
Malawi  -0.289  -0.193  0.255  -0.009  -0.075  0.032  0.096  0.126  0.125  -0.146 
Nigeria  0.001  -0.077  -0.035  0.130  0.193  -0.011  -0.116  0.381  0.005  -0.019 
South Africa  -0.242  0.353  0.711  0.201  -0.137  0.087  0.585  0.322  -0.061  -0.277 
Senegal  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  … 
North Africa       
Israel  -0.223  -0.002  0.348  0.072  -0.156  -0.255  -0.060  0.138  0.039  0.053 
Jordan  -0.105  0.103  -0.030  -0.107  -0.003  -0.102  -0.243  0.074  -0.034  0.103 
Morocco  -0.068  0.087  -0.056  0.041  0.002  0.026  -0.093  0.130  -0.055  -0.108 
Tunisia  -0.343  -0.002  0.077  0.084  0.202  -0.276  -0.106  0.310  0.105  0.149 
Latin America       
Argentina  -0.350  -0.222  0.740  0.605  -0.389  0.554  0.107  0.390  -0.079  -0.504 
Barbados  -0.069  0.068  0.375  0.066  -0.138  0.034  -0.013  0.065  -0.085  0.035 
Brazil  -0.091  -0.201  0.581  0.066  -0.105  0.149  0.025  0.161  -0.025  -0.308 
Columbia  -0.274  -0.144  0.396  0.063  0.249  -0.023  0.284  0.200  -0.126  0.265 
Chile  -0.371  0.380  -0.202  0.288  -0.102  0.210  -0.310  0.581  -0.085  -0.306 
Mexico  -0.307  0.303  0.766  0.168  -0.242  -0.123  0.329  0.347  0.063  -0.002 
Peru  -0.525  0.015  0.667  0.218  0.041  0.113  0.011  -0.042  0.048  0.195 
Trinidad  -0.142  -0.464  0.010  -0.092  0.162  -0.115  -0.291  0.024  0.182  -0.296 
Uruguay  -0.203  0.218  0.656  0.246  -0.151  -0.358  0.084  0.500  0.143  0.143 
Asia       
Bangladesh  -0.044  -0.243  0.305  -0.013  -0.192  -0.060  -0.057  -0.014  0.133  -0.128 
Hong Kong  -0.288  -0.067  0.662  -0.019  -0.286  -0.230  -0.186  0.638  0.053  -0.339 
India  -0.008  -0.255  -0.446  0.057  0.411  0.066  0.059  0.063  0.186  -0.093 
Korea, South  -0.246  -0.087  0.529  0.197  -0.303  -0.142  -0.087  0.345  -0.143  -0.289 
Malaysia  -0.261  -0.406  0.255  0.144  -0.095  -0.388  -0.151  0.547  0.067  -0.312 
Philippines  -0.803  -0.726  0.590  -0.036  0.041  0.338  0.154  0.103  -0.446  -0.422 
Pakistan  -0.246  -0.055  0.225  0.301  -0.103  -0.089  0.216  0.242  0.069  -0.073 
Turkey  0.083  -0.080  0.641  -0.271  -0.144  0.102  -0.016  0.112  -0.040  -0.112 
East Europe       
Hungary  0.286  0.002  0.001  -0.101  -0.114  0.034  -0.102  0.117  0.304  0.317 
Lithuania  0.362  0.131  -0.007  -0.419  -0.139  0.042  0.301  -0.068  -0.547  0.016 
Macedonia  -0.059  -0.016  0.265  -0.429  -0.035  -0.043  0.006  0.433  -0.109  -0.180 
Romania  -0.068  0.507  0.640  0.372  -0.129  0.323  0.679  0.583  0.083  -0.325 
Slovenia  0.398  -0.369  0.088  0.054  0.001  0.351  -0.609  0.220  0.177  0.085 
Slovak Republic  0.048  -0.313  0.545  0.181  0.171  0.023  -0.048  0.502  0.180  0.313 
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Table B.9 
Correlation between Real Domestic Output and the Trade Balance and the Terms of Trade 
Trade Ratio  Terms of Trade 
lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8  lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8 
US  -0.247  -0.403  -0.309  0.314  0.448  0.356  0.386  -0.006  -0.370  -0.261 
UK  0.169  0.001  -0.343  -0.110  0.174  0.151  0.191  -0.172  -0.158  0.244 
Japan  0.275  -0.244  -0.545  -0.154  0.330  0.425  0.239  -0.361  -0.276  0.029 
Africa       
Côte d'Ivoire  -0.047  0.049  -0.209  -0.107  -0.230  0.083  0.080  0.193  0.155  -0.197 
Malawi  0.215  0.204  -0.098  0.090  -0.057  0.090  0.275  0.058  0.047  -0.381 
Nigeria  -0.009  -0.039  0.333  -0.090  -0.156  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
South Africa  0.344  0.072  -0.557  -0.290  -0.080  -0.205  0.026  0.221  -0.006  0.005 
Senegal  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
North Africa       
Israel  0.068  -0.029  -0.253  -0.045  0.186  -0.008  0.072  0.133  -0.020  -0.126 
Jordan  -0.034  -0.325  0.086  0.042  0.102  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Morocco  0.091  -0.165  0.210  -0.086  -0.123  0.111  -0.145  -0.142  -0.007  -0.087 
Tunisia  -0.055  -0.208  0.321  -0.069  0.049  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Latin America       
Argentina  0.558  0.254  -0.692  -0.711  0.314  0.281  -0.089  0.284  -0.462  -0.519 
Barbados  0.067  -0.058  -0.153  -0.123  0.122  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Brazil  0.185  0.233  -0.515  -0.077  -0.062  0.175  0.147  -0.315  -0.096  -0.179 
Columbia  0.202  0.294  -0.191  -0.127  -0.043  -0.002  0.237  0.170  -0.126  0.139 
Chile  0.151  -0.439  0.523  -0.452  -0.036  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Mexico  0.250  -0.092  -0.608  -0.146  0.277  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Peru  0.526  -0.009  -0.554  -0.163  0.043  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Trinidad  0.022  0.159  0.018  0.231  -0.340  0.219  0.139  -0.093  -0.176  -0.406 
Uruguay  -0.036  -0.148  -0.273  -0.151  0.307  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Asia       
Bangladesh  -0.004  0.177  -0.269  0.084  0.084  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Hong Kong  0.284  -0.327  -0.317  0.204  0.010  0.416  -0.288  -0.555  0.276  0.078 
India  0.092  0.140  0.203  0.044  -0.265  -0.405  0.046  0.321  0.394  -0.009 
Korea, South  0.168  0.029  -0.322  -0.343  0.107  -0.035  0.349  0.362  -0.055  -0.004 
Malaysia  0.106  0.328  -0.026  -0.265  -0.200  -0.052  -0.280  0.525  0.272  -0.596 
Philippines  0.764  0.546  -0.152  -0.471  -0.472  0.249  0.672  0.451  -0.759  -0.487 
Pakistan  0.111  0.220  0.032  -0.160  0.027  0.046  0.248  0.046  -0.166  -0.139 
Turkey  -0.022  0.058  -0.545  0.249  0.078  -0.023  0.166  0.075  0.057  -0.041 
East Europe       
Hungary  -0.231  -0.095  0.107  0.371  0.398  -0.261  0.238  0.357  0.235  -0.067 
Lithuania  -0.531  0.258  -0.109  -0.272  0.337  0.199  0.052  0.101  -0.119  -0.263 
Macedonia  0.048  0.021  0.074  0.518  -0.207  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Romania  0.469  0.274  0.013  -0.304  -0.265  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Slovenia  0.028  -0.477  0.171  0.171  0.128  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Slovak Republic  -0.011  0.430  0.080  0.027  0.069  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 45 
Table B.10 
Correlation between Real Domestic Output and the Exchange Rate 
NEER  REER 
lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8  lag 8  lag 4  no lag  lead 4  lead 8 
US  0.133  -0.186  -0.164  -0.051  -0.007  0.039  -0.256  -0.144  0.101  -0.211 
UK  -0.358  -0.437  -0.234  0.139  0.455  -0.194  -0.408  -0.342  0.077  0.504 
Japan  0.189  -0.078  -0.247  -0.518  -0.086  0.224  -0.027  -0.242  -0.544  -0.121 
Africa       
Côte d'Ivoire  0.088  0.066  -0.062  0.363  -0.087  0.199  0.065  -0.166  0.240  -0.102 
Malawi  -0.300  -0.016  0.428  0.179  0.165  -0.218  0.161  0.364  -0.033  0.054 
Nigeria  -0.137  -0.344  -0.092  -0.067  -0.007  -0.088  -0.293  -0.219  -0.161  -0.034 
South Africa  -0.227  0.107  0.008  0.051  0.221  -0.203  0.087  -0.021  0.058  0.263 
Senegal  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
North Africa       
Israel  -0.168  -0.334  -0.225  -0.141  0.010  0.005  -0.399  -0.115  0.126  -0.026 
Jordan  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Morocco  0.090  -0.093  -0.090  -0.144  0.071  0.201  -0.061  -0.290  -0.072  0.137 
Tunisia  -0.073  0.097  -0.086  0.095  0.076  0.121  0.395  -0.128  -0.140  0.027 
Latin America       
Argentina  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Barbados  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Brazil  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Columbia  -0.199  0.383  0.263  0.225  -0.427  -0.371  0.228  0.292  0.354  -0.402 
Chile  0.101  -0.458  0.110  -0.062  -0.320  -0.538  -0.182  0.998  0.048  -0.274 
Mexico  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Peru  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Trinidad  0.328  0.145  -0.129  -0.144  -0.226  0.379  0.093  -0.229  -0.142  -0.219 
Uruguay  -0.404  -0.512  -0.274  -0.037  0.081  -0.477  -0.413  -0.115  -0.085  0.028 
Asia       
Bangladesh  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Hong Kong  -0.046  -0.681  0.091  0.724  -0.083  -0.108  -0.356  0.069  0.381  -0.013 
India  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Korea, South  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Malaysia  -0.393  0.017  0.359  0.119  -0.150  -0.446  -0.005  0.318  0.132  -0.077 
Philippines  0.005  0.119  0.277  0.014  -0.039  -0.156  -0.038  0.354  0.067  -0.082 
Pakistan  -0.085  0.170  -0.008  -0.212  -0.210  -0.131  0.196  -0.003  -0.194  -0.227 
Turkey  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
East Europe       
Hungary  0.200  0.238  -0.339  -0.623  -0.243  0.422  -0.098  -0.688  -0.617  -0.014 
Lithuania  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Macedonia  0.094  0.373  -0.153  -0.051  -0.237  -0.424  -0.192  -0.216  0.139  0.094 
Romania  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.159  0.186  0.285  0.034  -0.062 
Slovenia  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 




B.2. GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST RESULTS 
Table B. 11      Does Money Cause Output? 
Null Hypothesis  Lags: 4  Lags: 8 
   Obs  F  P   Obs  F  P  
 AG_BM does not Granger Cause AG_MP  37  2.1919  0.0957  33  0.7861  0.6219 
 AG_MP does not Granger Cause AG_BM     0.7009  0.5979     4.4014  0.0057 
 BB_BM does not Granger Cause BB_IP  124  1.8252  0.1287  120  2.0067  0.0528 
 BB_IP does not Granger Cause BB_BM     0.1809  0.9479     1.3773  0.2152 
 BR_BM does not Granger Cause BR_IP  53  2.2823  0.0755  49  2.6625  0.0231 
 BR_IP does not Granger Cause BR_BM     0.1283  0.9714     0.8401  0.5748 
 BS_BM does not Granger Cause BS_IP  118  0.8785  0.4794  114  2.2999  0.0266 
 BS_IP does not Granger Cause BS_BM     4.3233  0.0028     1.4198  0.1979 
 CB_BM does not Granger Cause CB_MP  97  4.2270  0.0035  93  3.1572  0.0039 
 CB_MP does not Granger Cause CB_BM     2.4241  0.0540     0.8855  0.5328 
 CL_BM does not Granger Cause CL_MP  102  3.0685  0.0201  98  1.7621  0.0968 
 CL_MP does not Granger Cause CL_BM     2.2016  0.0748     2.0232  0.0538 
 HK_BM does not Granger Cause HK_MP  29  0.6264  0.6492  25  0.3913  0.8970 
 HK_MP does not Granger Cause HK_BM     0.6169  0.6555     0.9053  0.5543 
 HN_BM does not Granger Cause HN_IP  66  1.1843  0.3275  62  0.7322  0.6625 
 HN_IP does not Granger Cause HN_BM     5.3906  0.0009     1.9762  0.0716 
 IN_BM does not Granger Cause IN_IP  154  0.4939  0.7402  150  0.2843  0.9702 
 IN_IP does not Granger Cause IN_BM     0.0586  0.9936     1.0634  0.3926 
 IS_BM does not Granger Cause IS_IP  139  0.2616  0.9021  135  1.5388  0.1511 
 IS_IP does not Granger Cause IS_BM     1.0742  0.3720     1.6890  0.1080 
 IV_BM does not Granger Cause IV_IP  140  1.0431  0.3876  136  2.6862  0.0095 
 IV_IP does not Granger Cause IV_BM     1.1956  0.3158     1.2504  0.2761 
 JO_BM does not Granger Cause JO_IP  128  0.1866  0.9450  124  2.0027  0.0529 
 JO_IP does not Granger Cause JO_BM     1.4780  0.2132     0.7696  0.6302 
 KO_BM does not Granger Cause KO_IP  154  3.3582  0.0116  150  1.8056  0.0813 
 KO_IP does not Granger Cause KO_BM     1.3423  0.2571     1.6352  0.1206 
 LN_BM does not Granger Cause LN_IP  44  2.9966  0.0316  40  5.1691  0.0009 
 LN_IP does not Granger Cause LN_BM     1.1365  0.3554     1.4042  0.2471 
 MC_BM does not Granger Cause MC_MP  149  1.0551  0.3812  145  0.8227  0.5840 
 MC_MP does not Granger Cause MC_BM     0.7292  0.5735     0.7331  0.6621 
 MI_BM does not Granger Cause MI_IP  134  1.8497  0.1235  130  1.0075  0.4345 
 MI_IP does not Granger Cause MI_BM     4.7217  0.0014     2.6592  0.0103 
 MK_BM does not Granger Cause MK_IP  41  0.6490  0.6317  37  1.3384  0.2816 
 MK_IP does not Granger Cause MK_BM     0.5658  0.6892     0.9670  0.4881 
 MX_BM does not Granger Cause MX_IP  155  0.9671  0.4275  151  1.4275  0.1905 
 MX_IP does not Granger Cause MX_BM     0.2818  0.8894     0.8111  0.5940 
 MY_BM does not Granger Cause MY_IP  136  0.6341  0.6391  132  0.8908  0.5267 
 MY_IP does not Granger Cause MY_BM     1.1310  0.3449     0.5456  0.8199 
 NG_BM does not Granger Cause NG_IP  132  1.7859  0.1359  128  1.7390  0.0971 
 NG_IP does not Granger Cause NG_BM     0.7809  0.5397     0.5033  0.8516 
 PE_BM does not Granger Cause PE_IP  61  2.6658  0.0425  57  2.7583  0.0159 
 PE_IP does not Granger Cause PE_BM     9.8509  0.0000     4.6841  0.0004 
 PH_BM does not Granger Cause PH_MP  92  0.0595  0.9933  88  0.4091  0.9118 
 PH_MP does not Granger Cause PH_BM     0.5744  0.6820     0.3104  0.9597 
 PK_BM does not Granger Cause PK_MP  133  1.9957  0.0993  129  1.2513  0.2764 
 PK_MP does not Granger Cause PK_BM     1.2390  0.2979     0.6772  0.7107 
 RM_BM does not Granger Cause RM_IP  97  3.8949  0.0058  93  2.7233  0.0108 
 RM_IP does not Granger Cause RM_BM     4.5843  0.0021     3.0519  0.0050 
 SA_BM does not Granger Cause SA_MP  132  3.5500  0.0089  128  2.7599  0.0081 
 SA_MP does not Granger Cause SA_BM     2.1909  0.0739     1.6522  0.1182 
 SG_BM does not Granger Cause SG_IP  69  0.8743  0.4848  65  0.9980  0.4499 
 SG_IP does not Granger Cause SG_BM     1.3272  0.2703     0.7432  0.6533 
 SJ_BM does not Granger Cause SJ_IP  49  1.8644  0.1356  45  1.3989  0.2401 
 SJ_IP does not Granger Cause SJ_BM     0.3601  0.8355     1.2533  0.3065 
 SX_BM does not Granger Cause SX_IP  45  1.4592  0.2349  41  0.9902  0.4679 
 SX_IP does not Granger Cause SX_BM     1.7499  0.1605     0.4219  0.8964 
 TK_BM does not Granger Cause TK_IP  72  0.9036  0.4674  68  0.6996  0.6903 
 TK_IP does not Granger Cause TK_BM     5.2531  0.0010     2.3070  0.0341 
 TT_BM does not Granger Cause TT_IP  100  0.4171  0.7959  96  0.4817  0.8657 
 TT_IP does not Granger Cause TT_BM     2.6532  0.0380     2.5398  0.0163 
 TU_BM does not Granger Cause TU_IP  108  2.6560  0.0373  100  1.6618  0.1201 
 TU_IP does not Granger Cause TU_BM     1.7411  0.1470     1.0680  0.3935 
 UY_BM does not Granger Cause UY_MP  91  1.2846  0.2828  87  0.8196  0.5879 
 UY_MP does not Granger Cause UY_BM     1.4745  0.2175     0.7040  0.6869 
 JP_BM does not Granger Cause JP_IP  155  3.9066  0.0048  151  2.2055  0.0307 
 JP_IP does not Granger Cause JP_BM     1.6442  0.1663     1.3841  0.2089 
 UK_BM does not Granger Cause UK_IP  155  1.0114  0.4036  151  1.0596  0.3953 
 UK_IP does not Granger Cause UK_BM     0.6236  0.6464     0.8640  0.5487 
 US_BM does not Granger Cause US_IP  155  4.1516  0.0032  151  1.9296  0.0605 
 US_IP does not Granger Cause US_BM     0.7077  0.5879     0.9723  0.4604 
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Table B. 12(a)      Does Credit Cause Output?  
(Real Domestic Credit) 
Null Hypothesis  Lags: 4  Lags: 8 
  Obs  F  P  Obs  F  P 
 AG_RDC does not Granger Cause AG_MP  37  1.1727  0.3441  33  0.7980  0.6129 
 AG_MP does not Granger Cause AG_RDC  3.8289  0.0132  5.9729  0.0012 
 BB_RDC does not Granger Cause BB_IP  124  3.4717  0.0102  120  0.9761  0.4589 
 BB_IP does not Granger Cause BB_RDC  1.9546  0.1061  1.2587  0.2734 
 BR_RDC does not Granger Cause BR_IP  48  0.3070  0.8716  44  1.4607  0.2177 
 BR_IP does not Granger Cause BR_RDC  0.9963  0.4212  4.3665  0.0018 
 BS_RDC does not Granger Cause BS_IP  41  1.3018  0.2903  37  1.8592  0.1245 
 BS_IP does not Granger Cause BS_RDC  2.5047  0.0616  0.7665  0.6356 
 CB_RDC does not Granger Cause CB_MP  97  2.8641  0.0278  93  2.6339  0.0133 
 CB_MP does not Granger Cause CB_RDC  2.3315  0.0620  0.9268  0.4995 
 CL_RDC does not Granger Cause CL_MP  102  2.6193  0.0399  98  2.7016  0.0109 
 CL_MP does not Granger Cause CL_RDC  2.0302  0.0965  1.3854  0.2154 
 HK_RDC does not Granger Cause HK_MP  41  3.2913  0.0228  37  1.9455  0.1087 
 HK_MP does not Granger Cause HK_RDC  0.1304  0.9702  0.4897  0.8492 
 HN_RDC does not Granger Cause HN_IP  66  2.0716  0.0965  62  1.8288  0.0964 
 HN_IP does not Granger Cause HN_RDC  0.5141  0.7256  0.5928  0.7786 
 IN_RDC does not Granger Cause IN_IP  154  1.5708  0.1852  150  1.5600  0.1428 
 IN_IP does not Granger Cause IN_RDC  2.2546  0.0661  2.7494  0.0077 
 IS_RDC does not Granger Cause IS_IP  95  1.6683  0.1647  91  1.6046  0.1381 
 IS_IP does not Granger Cause IS_RDC  1.7859  0.1390  1.5711  0.1482 
 IV_RDC does not Granger Cause IV_IP  140  0.3075  0.8726  136  0.2742  0.9732 
 IV_IP does not Granger Cause IV_RDC  1.6794  0.1585  1.0368  0.4125 
 JO_RDC does not Granger Cause JO_IP  112  4.4628  0.0023  108  3.9781  0.0004 
 JO_IP does not Granger Cause JO_RDC  13.7641  0.0000  8.1485  0.0000 
 KO_RDC does not Granger Cause KO_IP  136  1.0423  0.3881  132  0.8627  0.5502 
 KO_IP does not Granger Cause KO_RDC  0.8725  0.4825  0.6887  0.7008 
 LT_RDC does not Granger Cause LT_IP  45  1.6244  0.1893  41  1.0931  0.4014 
 LT_IP does not Granger Cause LT_RDC  0.2931  0.8806  1.0735  0.4135 
 MC_RDC does not Granger Cause MC_MP  149  0.2047  0.9354  145  0.8914  0.5258 
 MC_MP does not Granger Cause MC_RDC  0.3468  0.8459  0.4115  0.9123 
 MI_RDC does not Granger Cause MI_IP  94  0.5014  0.7348  90  1.6930  0.1146 
 MI_IP does not Granger Cause MI_RDC  2.7621  0.0327  1.1868  0.3188 
 MK_RDC does not Granger Cause MK_IP  41  0.2328  0.9178  37  0.4281  0.8903 
 MK_IP does not Granger Cause MK_RDC  0.9719  0.4365  1.3709  0.2678 
 MX_RDC does not Granger Cause MX_IP  113  1.6358  0.1708  109  1.4936  0.1703 
 MX_IP does not Granger Cause MX_RDC  2.5917  0.0408  1.4449  0.1886 
 MY_RDC does not Granger Cause MY_IP  136  3.6070  0.0081  132  1.7051  0.1045 
 MY_IP does not Granger Cause MY_RDC  0.3481  0.8450  0.9868  0.4501 
 NG_RDC does not Granger Cause NG_IP  132  0.3944  0.8123  128  0.6896  0.7000 
 NG_IP does not Granger Cause NG_RDC  0.2829  0.8886  0.3765  0.9311 
 PE_RDC does not Granger Cause PE_IP  59  6.0709  0.0005  55  2.6011  0.0225 
 PE_IP does not Granger Cause PE_RDC  6.9774  0.0002  1.1384  0.3609 
 PH_RDC does not Granger Cause PH_MP  92  0.5952  0.6671  88  0.5730  0.7966 
 PH_MP does not Granger Cause PH_RDC  0.2773  0.8919  0.2514  0.9789 
 PK_RDC does not Granger Cause PK_MP  133  1.6816  0.1584  129  1.2129  0.2979 
 PK_MP does not Granger Cause PK_RDC  2.9627  0.0223  1.2409  0.2821 
 RM_RDC does not Granger Cause RM_IP  30  0.4113  0.7985  26  1.7973  0.2001 
 RM_IP does not Granger Cause RM_RDC  2.7090  0.0579  21.0137  0.0001 
 SA_RDC does not Granger Cause SA_MP  132  2.3210  0.0605  128  2.2046  0.0322 
 SA_MP does not Granger Cause SA_RDC  1.2723  0.2845  0.9675  0.4652 
 SG_RDC does not Granger Cause SG_IP  69  2.8512  0.0313  65  0.8758  0.5434 
 SG_IP does not Granger Cause SG_RDC  2.3851  0.0611  2.9076  0.0100 
 SJ_RDC does not Granger Cause SJ_IP  49  0.7213  0.5825  45  1.1337  0.3721 
 SJ_IP does not Granger Cause SJ_RDC  1.8064  0.1466  1.3684  0.2529 
 SX_RDC does not Granger Cause SX_IP  45  2.0129  0.1134  41  1.3703  0.2589 
 SX_IP does not Granger Cause SX_RDC  0.3641  0.8325  0.7728  0.6300 
 TK_RDC does not Granger Cause TK_IP  72  2.6562  0.0409  68  1.2435  0.2938 
 TK_IP does not Granger Cause TK_RDC  1.6383  0.1757  1.3754  0.2297 
 TT_RDC does not Granger Cause TT_IP  100  3.2870  0.0145  96  2.0557  0.0503 
 TT_IP does not Granger Cause TT_RDC  1.3359  0.2627  1.4137  0.2038 
 TU_RDC does not Granger Cause TU_IP  45  1.2773  0.2970  41  1.0062  0.4571 
 TU_IP does not Granger Cause TU_RDC  1.3316  0.2770  0.7972  0.6107 
 UY_RDC does not Granger Cause UY_MP  83  1.2132  0.3125  79  1.0595  0.4029 
 UY_MP does not Granger Cause UY_RDC  0.9454  0.4427  1.2317  0.2961 
 JP_RDC does not Granger Cause JP_IP  155  5.5683  0.0003  151  2.7293  0.0081 
 JP_IP does not Granger Cause JP_RDC  0.4164  0.7966  0.5385  0.8258 
 UK_RDC does not Granger Cause UK_IP  155  1.6511  0.1646  151  1.3621  0.2188 
 UK_IP does not Granger Cause UK_RDC  0.4979  0.7373  0.5228  0.8377 
 US_RDC does not Granger Cause US_IP  155  6.6815  0.0001  151  3.3792  0.0015 




Table B. 12(b)      Does Credit Cause Output?  
(Nominal Domestic Credit) 
Null Hypothesis  Lags: 4  Lags: 8 
  Obs  F  P  Obs  F  P 
 AG_DC does not Granger Cause AG_MP  37  0.3035  0.8731  33  0.7991  0.6121 
 AG_MP does not Granger Cause AG_DC    0.8295  0.5178  0.6133  0.7545 
 BB_DC does not Granger Cause BB_IP  124  3.2328  0.0149  120  1.5521  0.1486 
 BB_IP does not Granger Cause BB_DC    0.9066  0.4626  0.7188  0.6745 
 BR_DC does not Granger Cause BR_IP  53  3.3618  0.0174  49  2.6349  0.0243 
 BR_IP does not Granger Cause BR_DC    0.2835  0.8871  0.6132  0.7601 
 BS_DC does not Granger Cause BS_IP  118  1.9449  0.1081  114  2.2338  0.0312 
 BS_IP does not Granger Cause BS_DC    0.6721  0.6127  0.5992  0.7765 
 CB_DC does not Granger Cause CB_MP  97  3.1355  0.0185  93  2.6758  0.0120 
 CB_MP does not Granger Cause CB_DC    1.8365  0.1289  0.7383  0.6574 
 CL_DC does not Granger Cause CL_MP  102  2.3271  0.0620  98  2.5009  0.0176 
 CL_MP does not Granger Cause CL_DC    2.2861  0.0659  2.0422  0.0515 
 HK_DC does not Granger Cause HK_MP  41  2.7077  0.0476  37  2.0321  0.0949 
 HK_MP does not Granger Cause HK_DC    0.0917  0.9844  0.1693  0.9927 
 HN_DC does not Granger Cause HN_IP  66  2.7322  0.0377  62  1.3197  0.2585 
 HN_IP does not Granger Cause HN_DC    0.5488  0.7006  0.9269  0.5038 
 IN_DC does not Granger Cause IN_IP  154  0.6305  0.6415  150  0.7963  0.6068 
 IN_IP does not Granger Cause IN_DC    2.8665  0.0253  3.0677  0.0033 
 IS_DC does not Granger Cause IS_IP  136  2.5895  0.0398  132  2.3372  0.0230 
 IS_IP does not Granger Cause IS_DC    1.7144  0.1508  2.7985  0.0072 
 IV_DC does not Granger Cause IV_IP  140  0.1976  0.9393  136  0.3279  0.9539 
 IV_IP does not Granger Cause IV_DC    2.6618  0.0355  1.7771  0.0882 
 JO_DC does not Granger Cause JO_IP  128  12.9022  0.0000  124  5.9984  0.0000 
 JO_IP does not Granger Cause JO_DC    7.5532  0.0000  3.2757  0.0022 
 KO_DC does not Granger Cause KO_IP  154  0.3222  0.8627  150  0.5214  0.8388 
 KO_IP does not Granger Cause KO_DC    1.6915  0.1551  0.6170  0.7624 
 LT_DC does not Granger Cause LT_IP  45  0.7241  0.5812  41  1.1135  0.3891 
 LT_IP does not Granger Cause LT_DC    0.6323  0.6427  0.6405  0.7363 
 MC_DC does not Granger Cause MC_MP  149  0.5549  0.6958  145  0.8869  0.5296 
 MC_MP does not Granger Cause MC_DC    0.1803  0.9483  0.3072  0.9621 
 MI_DC does not Granger Cause MI_IP  134  0.2532  0.9073  130  1.1946  0.3086 
 MI_IP does not Granger Cause MI_DC    1.3353  0.2606  0.8893  0.5280 
 MK_DC does not Granger Cause MK_IP  41  0.4352  0.7822  37  0.8128  0.5999 
 MK_IP does not Granger Cause MK_DC    0.7109  0.5905  0.5169  0.8298 
 MX_DC does not Granger Cause MX_IP  155  3.1106  0.0172  151  2.0187  0.0487 
 MX_IP does not Granger Cause MX_DC    1.1839  0.3204  1.4209  0.1932 
 MY_DC does not Granger Cause MY_IP  136  4.0124  0.0042  132  1.7562  0.0929 
 MY_IP does not Granger Cause MY_DC    0.1902  0.9431  1.0658  0.3920 
 NG_DC does not Granger Cause NG_IP  132  0.0396  0.9970  128  0.1487  0.9965 
 NG_IP does not Granger Cause NG_DC    0.4715  0.7566  0.5472  0.8185 
 PE_DC does not Granger Cause PE_IP  61  7.5592  0.0001  57  3.5090  0.0037 
 PE_IP does not Granger Cause PE_DC    16.3311  0.0000  2.4440  0.0296 
 PH_DC does not Granger Cause PH_MP  92  1.3542  0.2570  88  0.8161  0.5908 
 PH_MP does not Granger Cause PH_DC    0.4616  0.7637  0.1375  0.9972 
 PK_DC does not Granger Cause PK_MP  133  0.8667  0.4860  129  0.6921  0.6978 
 PK_MP does not Granger Cause PK_DC    1.6867  0.1572  0.9096  0.5113 
 RM_DC does not Granger Cause RM_IP  30  0.7726  0.5552  26  2.6874  0.0812 
 RM_IP does not Granger Cause RM_DC    3.3325  0.0291  6.6317  0.0052 
 SA_DC does not Granger Cause SA_MP  132  2.2363  0.0689  128  1.9980  0.0531 
 SA_MP does not Granger Cause SA_DC    1.8296  0.1274  1.0249  0.4217 
 SG_DC does not Granger Cause SG_IP  69  2.7171  0.0379  65  1.1832  0.3288 
 SG_IP does not Granger Cause SG_DC    3.5130  0.0121  3.2098  0.0053 
 SJ_DC does not Granger Cause SJ_IP  49  0.6962  0.5991  45  1.7006  0.1423 
 SJ_IP does not Granger Cause SJ_DC    1.9350  0.1234  1.3526  0.2597 
 SX_DC does not Granger Cause SX_IP  45  1.8227  0.1458  41  1.3564  0.2648 
 SX_IP does not Granger Cause SX_DC    0.2993  0.8765  0.9289  0.5110 
 TK_DC does not Granger Cause TK_IP  72  2.7031  0.0382  68  1.5041  0.1791 
 TK_IP does not Granger Cause TK_DC    2.4131  0.0582  1.4044  0.2174 
 TT_DC does not Granger Cause TT_IP  100  3.3857  0.0125  96  1.6833  0.1155 
 TT_IP does not Granger Cause TT_DC    1.8859  0.1196  2.1078  0.0446 
 TU_DC does not Granger Cause TU_IP  109  1.7445  0.1462  101  1.5616  0.1488 
 TU_IP does not Granger Cause TU_DC    1.8981  0.1166  1.0491  0.4066 
 UY_DC does not Granger Cause UY_MP  91  1.0391  0.3922  87  0.7973  0.6068 
 UY_MP does not Granger Cause UY_DC    1.0711  0.3762  1.0621  0.3995 
 JP_DC does not Granger Cause JP_IP  155  1.6363  0.1682  151  1.9825  0.0532 
 JP_IP does not Granger Cause JP_DC    1.2097  0.3092  0.9662  0.4652 
 UK_DC does not Granger Cause UK_IP  155  0.9722  0.4247  151  1.0190  0.4248 
 UK_IP does not Granger Cause UK_DC    0.3609  0.8361  0.8623  0.5501 
 US_DC does not Granger Cause US_IP  155  2.3756  0.0547  151  1.5882  0.1339 
 US_IP does not Granger Cause US_DC    4.3207  0.0025  3.1956  0.0024 
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Table B.13(a)        Do Interest Rates Cause Output? 
(Real Lending Rate) 
Null Hypothesis    Lags: 4      Lags: 8   
  Obs  F  P.   Obs  F  P  
 AG_RLR does not Granger Cause AG_MP  37  2.5503  0.0612  33  0.7682  0.6353 
 AG_MP does not Granger Cause AG_RLR    1.0727  0.3886    1.7859  0.1540 
 BB_RLR does not Granger Cause BB_IP  92  1.1281  0.3489  88  0.5418  0.8211 
 BB_IP does not Granger Cause BB_RLR    1.9602  0.1082    1.4952  0.1744 
 BR_RLR does not Granger Cause BR_IP  29  2.9483  0.0457  25  0.3305  0.9309 
 BR_IP does not Granger Cause BR_RLR    2.4338  0.0810    2.3153  0.1282 
 BS_RLR does not Granger Cause BS_IP  41  0.8238  0.5198  37  1.1363  0.3824 
 BS_IP does not Granger Cause BS_RLR    0.0645  0.9920    0.0266  1.0000 
 CB_RLR does not Granger Cause CB_MP  73  2.1617  0.0833  69  1.1212  0.3648 
 CB_MP does not Granger Cause CB_RLR    2.8167  0.0323    1.8840  0.0825 
 CL_RLR does not Granger Cause CL_MP  117  3.4036  0.0116  113  2.6644  0.0110 
 CL_MP does not Granger Cause CL_RLR    1.4565  0.2205    2.5780  0.0136 
 HK_RLR does not Granger Cause HK_MP  53  2.4805  0.0576  49  1.0988  0.3896 
 HK_MP does not Granger Cause HK_RLR    0.5299  0.7144    1.0697  0.4082 
 HN_RLR does not Granger Cause HN_IP  62  1.4750  0.2229  58  0.7464  0.6506 
 HN_IP does not Granger Cause HN_RLR    0.9333  0.4518    0.7533  0.6448 
 IN_RLR does not Granger Cause IN_IP  101  1.1012  0.3608  97  1.1111  0.3648 
 IN_IP does not Granger Cause IN_RLR    1.3893  0.2438    0.6418  0.7403 
 IS_RLR does not Granger Cause IS_IP  100  2.5025  0.0477  96  1.3338  0.2393 
 IS_IP does not Granger Cause IS_RLR    2.1866  0.0767    1.4537  0.1878 
 JO_RLR does not Granger Cause JO_IP  49  1.8919  0.1307  45  1.6623  0.1522 
 JO_IP does not Granger Cause JO_RLR    0.8875  0.4802    0.6361  0.7407 
 KO_RLR does not Granger Cause KO_IP  95  3.4601  0.0114  91  2.0991  0.0464 
 KO_IP does not Granger Cause KO_RLR    1.5287  0.2010    1.1020  0.3718 
 LT_RLR does not Granger Cause LT_IP  44  0.2455  0.9104  40  1.9184  0.1059 
 LT_IP does not Granger Cause LT_RLR    2.0217  0.1127    2.5242  0.0393 
 MC_RLR does not Granger Cause MC_MP  97  0.6200  0.6494  93  1.0390  0.4148 
 MC_MP does not Granger Cause MC_RLR  2.7917  0.0310    2.8541  0.0079 
 MI_RLR does not Granger Cause MI_IP  94  1.3636  0.2534  90  0.6823  0.7056 
 MI_IP does not Granger Cause MI_RLR    1.9953  0.1025    1.8011  0.0906 
 MK_RLR does not Granger Cause MK_IP  40  0.4654  0.7606  36  0.2930  0.9597 
 MK_IP does not Granger Cause MK_RLR    0.7094  0.5917    1.7901  0.1418 
 MX_RLR does not Granger Cause MX_IP  45  3.3696  0.0193  41  1.4169  0.2399 
 MX_IP does not Granger Cause MX_RLR    1.2720  0.2990    0.6382  0.7381 
 MY_RLR does not Granger Cause MY_IP  112  1.6633  0.1642  108  1.3939  0.2098 
 MY_IP does not Granger Cause MY_RLR    1.0707  0.3749    0.7222  0.6714 
 NG_RLR does not Granger Cause NG_IP  132  6.0214  0.0002  128  3.2750  0.0022 
 NG_IP does not Granger Cause NG_RLR    0.8248  0.5118    2.0939  0.0422 
 PE_RLR does not Granger Cause PE_IP  54  2.5363  0.0530  50  4.0388  0.0020 
 PE_IP does not Granger Cause PE_RLR    0.8948  0.4750    1.0248  0.4374 
 PH_RLR does not Granger Cause PH_MP  93  2.5444  0.0454  89  1.4673  0.1844 
 PH_MP does not Granger Cause PH_RLR    2.5775  0.0432    1.4322  0.1981 
 SA_RLR does not Granger Cause SA_MP  155  3.6299  0.0075  151  4.2528  0.0001 
 SA_MP does not Granger Cause SA_RLR    1.8537  0.1217    2.7803  0.0071 
 SJ_RLR does not Granger Cause SJ_IP  49  3.0739  0.0268  45  1.9369  0.0937 
 SJ_IP does not Granger Cause SJ_RLR    0.8194  0.5205    0.6069  0.7642 
 SX_RLR does not Granger Cause SX_IP  45  1.8110  0.1481  41  1.9402  0.1001 
 SX_IP does not Granger Cause SX_RLR    1.3277  0.2784    1.7012  0.1496 
 TT_RLR does not Granger Cause TT_IP  80  0.5110  0.7278  76  0.3060  0.9609 
 TT_IP does not Granger Cause TT_RLR    2.1218  0.0870    1.7530  0.1051 
 UY_RLR does not Granger Cause UY_MP  83  1.6154  0.1794  79  1.0618  0.4013 
 UY_MP does not Granger Cause UY_RLR    2.1595  0.0819    1.0463  0.4121 
 JP_RLR does not Granger Cause JP_IP  155  1.1276  0.3459  151  1.8110  0.0802 
 JP_IP does not Granger Cause JP_RLR    2.2665  0.0648    1.3851  0.2085 
 UK_RLR does not Granger Cause UK_IP  151  2.3375  0.0582  147  1.7144  0.1008 
 UK_IP does not Granger Cause UK_RLR    2.0298  0.0934    2.8466  0.0060 
 US_RLR does not Granger Cause US_IP  155  4.4765  0.0019  151  2.4205  0.0179 







Table B.13(b)        Do Interest Rates Cause Output? 
(Real Money Market Rate) 
Null Hypothesis  Lags: 4  Lags: 8 
  Obs  F  P  Obs  F  P 
 BR_RMMR does not Granger Cause BR_IP  47  3.2568  0.0158  44  2.3502  0.0462 
 BR_IP does not Granger Cause BR_RMMR  0.3939  0.8498  0.1748  0.9925 
 CB_RMMR does not Granger Cause CB_MP  36  1.1471  0.3622  33  1.3281  0.2985 
 CB_MP does not Granger Cause CB_RMMR  3.7649  0.0112  3.2476  0.0215 
 CL_RMMR does not Granger Cause CL_MP  108  3.1562  0.0111  105  2.0903  0.0450 
 CL_MP does not Granger Cause CL_RMMR  0.5763  0.7180  0.3907  0.9229 
 HK_RMMR does not Granger Cause HK_MP  40  1.2139  0.3276  37  0.9144  0.5247 
 HK_MP does not Granger Cause HK_RMMR  2.7178  0.0393  1.5793  0.1934 
 IN_RMMR does not Granger Cause IN_IP  126  0.1518  0.9791  123  0.4254  0.9035 
 IN_IP does not Granger Cause IN_RMMR  3.3790  0.0069  1.9291  0.0630 
 IV_RMMR does not Granger Cause IV_IP  109  1.1866  0.3213  106  1.9999  0.0554 
 IV_IP does not Granger Cause IV_RMMR  0.5506  0.7375  0.4709  0.8736 
 KO_RMMR does not Granger Cause KO_IP  109  4.2491  0.0015  106  3.1829  0.0032 
 KO_IP does not Granger Cause KO_RMMR  2.4734  0.0373  1.0935  0.3753 
 LT_RMMR does not Granger Cause LT_IP  40  0.3097  0.9031  37  0.2350  0.9793 
 LT_IP does not Granger Cause LT_RMMR  1.3994  0.2538  1.4240  0.2466 
 MX_RMMR does not Granger Cause MX_IP  91  3.7132  0.0045  88  2.6524  0.0132 
 MX_IP does not Granger Cause MX_RMMR  0.6033  0.6976  0.5065  0.8476 
 MY_RMMR does not Granger Cause MY_IP  135  4.5021  0.0008  132  2.2458  0.0289 
 MY_IP does not Granger Cause MY_RMMR  1.3283  0.2565  0.6479  0.7359 
 PH_RMMR does not Granger Cause PH_MP  92  1.7247  0.1383  89  1.2474  0.2847 
 PH_MP does not Granger Cause PH_RMMR  0.3277  0.8949  0.1337  0.9975 
 PK_RMMR does not Granger Cause PK_MP  132  1.6681  0.1474  129  2.4206  0.0189 
 PK_MP does not Granger Cause PK_RMMR  1.6644  0.1483  0.7709  0.6290 
 SA_RMMR does not Granger Cause SA_MP  154  3.3202  0.0072  151  2.9908  0.0041 
 SA_MP does not Granger Cause SA_RMMR  2.1976  0.0578  2.8731  0.0055 
 SG_RMMR does not Granger Cause SG_IP  68  4.5966  0.0014  65  2.9993  0.0082 
 SG_IP does not Granger Cause SG_RMMR  0.8447  0.5238  0.7734  0.6277 
 SJ_RMMR does not Granger Cause SJ_IP  45  1.5947  0.1881  42  0.9741  0.4781 
 SJ_IP does not Granger Cause SJ_RMMR  0.9264  0.4760  0.8499  0.5694 
 TK_RMMR does not Granger Cause TK_IP  70  8.6879  0.0000  67  6.2854  0.0000 
 TK_IP does not Granger Cause TK_RMMR  0.2995  0.9112  0.3641  0.9345 
 TU_RMMR does not Granger Cause TU_IP  44  0.0907  0.9932  41  0.9006  0.5316 
 TU_IP does not Granger Cause TU_RMMR  1.2652  0.3021  1.3107  0.2852 
 JP_RMMR does not Granger Cause JP_IP  154  4.0262  0.0019  151  2.8529  0.0058 
 JP_IP does not Granger Cause JP_RMMR  2.6660  0.0246  1.3680  0.2161 
 UK_RMMR does not Granger Cause UK_IP  128  3.7452  0.0035  125  2.6230  0.0115 
 UK_IP does not Granger Cause UK_RMMR  6.1153  0.0001  5.1332  0.0000 
 US_RMMR does not Granger Cause US_IP  154  2.0440  0.0760  151  1.6788  0.1091 
 US_IP does not Granger Cause US_RMMR  5.4516  0.0001  3.2145  0.0023 
 
 
Notes: IP – real industrial production, MP – real manufacturing production, BM – broad money, DC – 
domestic private sector credit, RDC – real domestic private sector credit, RMMR – real money market rate, 
RLR – real lending rate 
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